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CRIMINAL LAW 
MOTUS ANIMI IN MENTE INSANA: AN 
EMOTION-ORIENTED PARADIGM OF 
LEGAL INSANITY INFORMED BY THE 
NEUROSCIENCE OF MORAL JUDGMENTS 
AND DECISION-MAKING 
FEDERICA COPPOLA* 
Legal insanity is deeply rooted in an intellectualistic conception of the 
capacity for moral rationality.  The vast majority of insanity standards 
essentially consider the integrity of the defendant’s cognitive faculties at the 
time of the offense.  However, the cognitivist model of legal insanity 
collides with the body of neuroscientific and behavioral literature about the 
critical role of emotions in moral judgments and decision-making 
processes. Drawing upon this scientific knowledge, this Article reforms the 
intellectualistic substance of the capacity for moral rationality that 
underlies the insanity doctrine by including emotions in its relevant 
psychological set.  Hence, it provides a revised model of legal insanity, one 
that gives more prominence to individuals’ emotional faculties in relation 
to the crime committed.  The analysis highlights that the legal 
reconsideration of the role of emotions within the capacity for moral 
rationality turns the insanity defense into a tripartite, more dimensional 
test—one inclusive of emotional, cognitive, and volitional prongs.  
Normative arguments in support of the proposed alternative paradigm of 
legal insanity are illustrated and discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between neuroscientific disciplines and legal insanity 
has never been simple.  Many books and articles have been written, many 
conferences have been held, and many contrasting views have been 
proposed, but the debate continues. On the one side of the spectrum, some 
authors have called for neurological defense on the grounds that brain 
diseases may excuse the crime.1  At the other end of the spectrum, some 
 
 1 See, e.g., Richard Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and Legal 
Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51, 53(2006) (arguing in favor of a 
return to control tests for insanity “that comport with modern neuroscience research on the 
role of brain dysfunction in impulsive criminal behavior”). 
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scholars have expressed concern that brain images and scans can actually 
mislead juries, giving them the wrong impression that the brain is wholly 
responsible for human behavior, which may allow for criminal conduct to 
be excused based on any brain abnormality in the defendant.2  The lack of 
resolution of these disputes makes ambiguous the contribution of 
neuroscience to legal insanity, even at the theoretical level.  This Article 
attempts to fill this gap and proposes one possible approach by which 
neuroscientific knowledge may plausibly contribute to a rethinking of the 
insanity doctrine without causing any dramatic upheaval to the nature of 
culpability and criminal responsibility. 
Brain mechanisms do not alone account for an individual’s (lack of) 
culpability.  Culpability and insanity are not neuroscientific concepts, nor 
can they be localized in certain neural patterns.3  Yet, although brain 
mechanisms cannot provide an answer to normative questions about 
culpability and criminal responsibility,4 these physical features may become 
integral to discussions of culpability (and the lack thereof), as long as they 
contribute to a better understanding of the processes that underlie the 
capacities necessary for one to be considered culpable.  This consideration 
of brain mechanisms, once again, does not equate to attributing a normative 
significance to neuroscience, nor to claiming that neuroscience could erode 
the nature of culpability and criminal responsibility.  Rather, neuroscientific 
information can be used as a source of knowledge to improve the accuracy 
of the legal-psychological assumptions that support notions of culpability. 
 
 2 See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, New Neuroscience, Old Problems, in NEUROSCIENCE AND 
THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 157 (Brent Garland ed., 2004); Michael 
Pardo & Dennis Patterson, Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience, 2010 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1211, 1213 (“At its most general level, law regulates human behavior. Human 
action tout court is just one of many issues within the scope of the neurolaw literature. 
Moreover, legal judgments are made by human decision makers, who act and decide based 
on reasons, which is just more behavior to be reduced within a neurolaw framework. Given 
the strong claims made on behalf of neuroscience, coupled with the growing enthusiasm for 
the enterprise, careful scrutiny is warranted.”). 
 3 See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility, 3 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 405 (2006) (“The criteria for responsibility are behavioral and 
normative, not empirically demonstrable states of the brain . . . . Brains are not held 
responsible. Acting people are. To believe that brain evidence has more than simple 
evidentiary value for assessing responsibility is to misconceive the criteria for 
responsibility.”). 
 4 See, e.g., Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, 5 PLOS BIOL. 0693, 
0696–97 (2007) (observing that “[d]etermining criminal responsibility is a normative legal 
conclusion, not an empirical factual one, made in the context of a variety of often conflicting 
aspirations. Therefore, even the best neuroscientific study can only afford factual evidence to 
be weighed alongside . . . normative considerations, rather than actually resolve the legal 
question as to which the factual evidence is relevant.”). 
4 COPPOLA [Vol. 109 
Over the past thirty years, neuroscience research has greatly advanced 
our understanding of the dynamics that underlie decision-making processes 
leading to moral conduct.  One of most relevant insights emerging from this 
research concerns the critical role that emotions and emotional processes 
play either in informing or in hindering moral decision-making.5  In 
confirmation of this insight, brain-imaging studies on specific psychiatric 
populations characterized by marked antisocial tendencies have found links 
between these conditions and abnormal structure or functioning of the same 
socio-emotional brain circuits that appear to be significantly involved in 
moral decision-making.6  Altogether, consistent with behavioral studies, 
research in neuroscience supports the view that emotions are crucial 
mediators for moral behavior; that is, moral behavior also depends largely 
on proper and balanced emotional functioning.7 
This Article specifically uses this branch of neuroscientific knowledge 
to revise the cognitivist model of the capacity for moral rationality, which 
lies at the core of the insanity defense.  It provides an alternative model of 
legal insanity: one that gives more prominence to individuals’ emotional 
faculties in relation to the crime committed.  Additionally, it offers several 
arguments for why an emotion-oriented model of legal insanity—informed 
by scientific knowledge—is normatively plausible. 
The argument offered here proceeds as follows.  Part I traces the 
cognitivist model of insanity in contemporary criminal law.  It begins with 
a preliminary discussion of the intellectualistic view of the capacity for 
moral rationality, which forms the benchmark of culpability and criminal 
responsibility.  As will be made plain, the capacity for moral rationality 
consists of one’s ability to engage in instrumental practical reasoning 
dictated by moral reasons.  Importantly, in the eyes of the law, the capacity 
for moral rationality is entirely governed by cognitive faculties.  Therefore, 
agents may be considered culpable as long as they possess intact cognitive 
faculties that enable them to know or understand the meaning of their 
unlawful conduct and willfully choose to engage in that unlawful conduct 
accordingly.  In sum, cognition is the only mental dimension that defines 
the legally relevant mind. Part I subsequently explores how the intellect-
based understanding of the capacity for moral rationality is reflected in the 
insanity doctrine.  By analyzing formulations of insanity standards, it 
highlights that insanity tests are fundamentally focused on the evaluation of 
a defendant’s cognitive faculties at the time of the offence.  On the one 
 
 5 See infra Part III. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
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hand, cognitive defects are considered responsible for a defendant’s lack of 
knowledge, or understanding, of the factual and moral meaning of the 
offense (cognitive prong of legal insanity).  On the other hand, by impairing 
defendants’ capacity for comprehension, cognitive defects are also assumed 
to affect their capacity to control their impulses (volitional prong of legal 
insanity). 
Part II provides further support for the criminal law’s adherence to an 
intellectualistic model of legal insanity by analyzing the negligible role that 
emotions are afforded within the evaluation of insanity.  In line with this 
rationalist perspective, criminal law manifests a view that emotions make 
no positive contribution to moral rational reasoning.  It presupposes that 
emotions are mental occurrences that, when excessively intense, can 
provoke sudden loss of control. 
The negative relationship between emotions and the capacity for moral 
rationality is echoed in insanity standards in two ways.  First, insanity 
standards do not provide an emotional capacity test, which is to say, a test 
measuring a defendant’s capacity to emotionally appreciate the moral 
significance of the offence.  Second, insanity standards give prominence to 
self-control impairments as long as they are linked to a defect of cognitive 
faculties.  On the contrary, self-control impairments arising from emotional 
disturbance are usually considered as mitigating circumstances, to be 
considered in the sentencing phase or as limited diminished-capacity 
conditions, such as the common law “heat of passion” and the Model Penal 
Code’s (MPC’s) “extreme emotional disturbance” (EED).  The diminished 
weight of emotion in such an evaluation, as I contend, is for one 
fundamental reason: because emotions are not treated as mental factors that 
contribute to one’s capacity for moral rationality, a lack of self-control due 
to emotional impairment is not viewed as the kind of moral rationality 
defect that can justify an excuse. 
Part III measures the rationalist model of legal insanity against 
neuroscientific insights into the role of emotions in moral judgments and 
decision-making.  Its objective is not to carry out a detailed literature 
review of neuroscientific studies.  Rather, and more narrowly, it aims to use 
relevant neuroscientific literature to emphasize two main mistaken 
assumptions about moral decision-making and behavior emerging from the 
current intellect-based model of legal insanity.  First, it outlines that in 
moral judgments and decision-making processes, emotional faculties play a 
role equally critical to that of cognitive faculties.  Notably, it emphasizes 
that emotions and emotional faculties influence moral judgments and 
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decision-making at both subconscious and conscious levels8 and, thus, that 
cognitive faculties alone cannot give rise to moral decisions without 
 
 8 In common language, emotions and feelings are used interchangeably. An emotion is 
usually referred to as something that is felt. People generally call an emotion their feeling of 
fear, happiness, anger, and so on. However, it is important to note the distinction that 
neuroscientists draw between emotions and feelings. Emotions can be defined as “the 
process[es] by which the brain determines or computes the value of a stimulus.” JOSEPH 
LEDOUX, SYNAPTIC SELF: HOW OUR BRAINS BECOME WHO WE ARE 206 (2002). In contrast, 
feelings are the subjective experience, or awareness, of said emotional responses. While 
emotions are mostly unconscious, feelings imply some degree of awareness (i.e., 
consciousness). When a stimulus occurs, people react subconsciously with their emotions. 
Only after the emotion—that is, the automatic response to that stimulus—has occurred do 
people become aware of it. This state of awareness is what transforms an emotion into a 
feeling. In other words, it is only when people get to a stage of awareness of the processes 
activated by an emotion that they have a feeling. Although there is a common view on what 
kind of states emotions and feelings are, as well as on the fact that both emotions and 
feelings do influence decision-making and behavior, neuroscientists hold heterogeneous 
positions on the exact relationship between emotions and feelings. See Joseph LeDoux, 
Feelings: What are They and How Does the Brain Make Them?, 144 DAEDALUS, J. AM. 
ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 96 (2015) (suggesting that emotions and feelings serve radically 
different functions, and thus cannot be placed on the same level. Emotions are adaptive 
responses to critical environmental challenges. An emotional reaction is a pivotal behavior 
of all organisms, both human and nonhuman. Emotions form automatic behavioral 
responses, motivational states to external stimuli that serve survival functions. However, 
emotions do not contribute to the emotional life of an individual. On the other hand, feelings 
are the aware and self-reported experience of an emotional response. Feelings are a matter of 
consciousness. Consciousness, and therefore prototypical cognitive systems and functions, 
are what make us emotional); cf. ANTONIO DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: 
BODY AND EMOTIONS IN THE MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 36 (1999) (arguing that feelings are 
natural evolutions of emotions. Emotions affect the mind when they evolve into feelings. 
Because feelings are the natural sequence of emotions, one’s feeling of a given emotion is 
ultimately the emotion per se. Thus, because each feeling is the natural corollary of a 
respective emotion, the two things can be referred to by using same names. For instance, 
fear can be both an emotion—i.e., a body state of change triggered by an external threat—
and a feeling, i.e., the conscious perception of the body change. While emotions are 
evolutionary adaptations, unaware and embodied states that trigger physiological responses 
to external stimuli, feelings are nothing more nor less than the conscious perceptions, the 
lasting memory, a neural and mental representation of emotions. According to Damasio, 
while “emotions-proper” are always unconscious, feelings may or may not involve 
consciousness. He spots three stages of emotional processing along a continuum: “a state of 
emotion, which can be triggered and executed nonconsciously; a state of feeling, which can 
be represented nonconsciously; and a state of feeling made conscious, i.e., known to the 
organism having both emotion and feeling”). To put it simply, emotions provoke changes in 
the body. These bodily changes are projected and mapped in the brain. Bodily changes may 
remain non-conscious or may be experienced consciously as ‘feelings.’ Therefore, 
emotionally-salient stimuli may lead to feelings indirectly by triggering an emotion that 
causes a change in body state which is subsequently ‘felt.’ The line between the emotion and 
the feeling may thus be very blurred. As feelings are the natural sequence of emotions, we 
may say that our feeling of a given emotion is ultimately the emotion per se. See also Ralph 
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emotional influence.  Second, the Article suggests that self-control abilities 
depend on their own mechanisms, encompassing many distinct (and 
dissociable) cognitive and socio-emotional processes.  As such, people’s 
capacity for self-control does not necessarily depend on the cognitive 
ability to know that a certain action is wrong. 
In light of the highlighted scientific insights, Part IV draws up and 
proposes a tripartite model for legal insanity which accounts for the 
relevance of emotional factors.  While the cognitive prong of the insanity 
tests remains essentially unaltered, the Article first advocates for the 
inclusion of an emotional capacity test—a test measuring defendants’ 
capacity to emotionally appreciate the moral significance of their conduct—
in insanity standards.  Second, it advocates for the recognition of an 
independent volitional prong for the test, to measure the defendants’ 
abilities to make decisions and exercise self-control, regardless of their 
intellectual ability to tell right from wrong.  Furthermore, Part IV analyzes 
the consequences that the expansion of the substance of the volitional prong 
to also incorporate emotional components has for the diminished-capacity 
doctrine, as it is regulated by both the common law “heat of passion” and 
the MPC’s EED standards. 
Part V illustrates several arguments that support the normative 
plausibility of the new model developed for the insanity defense.  In 
particular, it argues that an emotion-oriented model of legal insanity not 
only better complies with the principle of personal guilt, but also meets the 
aims of two major justifications for punishment, namely culpability-based 
retribution and rehabilitation. 
A final caveat is worth mentioning: this Article uses scientific insights 
into moral judgments and decision-making to provide a theoretical model of 
legal insanity.  Its aim is to interpret knowledge emerging from said 
scientific data, and combine that knowledge with legal arguments that 
might lead to a theoretical reconsideration of traditional approaches to the 
insanity defense.  Considering its doctrinal scope, this Article does not 
address several practical issues concerning the implementation of this 
alternative model of legal insanity in forensic settings.  These issues range 
from how the newly introduced emotional prong of insanity standards 
 
Adolphs, How Should Neuroscience Study Emotions? By Distinguishing Emotion States, 
Concepts, and Experiences, 12 SOC. COGN. & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCI. 24, 27 (2017) 
(suggesting that emotions are biological functional states that regulate behavior and allow us 
to cope with environmental challenges. However, emotion states are not the same as 
conscious experiences of emotion (i.e., feelings). Rather, emotion states cause the conscious 
experience of emotions (i.e., feelings). Put this way, feelings are derivative of emotion 
states). 
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should be assessed through reliable judgments (both empirical and 
normative) to how the criminal justice system should appropriately deal 
with contentious classes of offenders who could be eligible for the new 
insanity defense.  These issues are critical, and they will be explored 
thoroughly in future works. 
I. THE RATIONALISM BEHIND THE INSANITY DOCTRINE 
The insanity defense is an affirmative defense whereby criminal 
defendants seek to be excused from criminal liability on the grounds that, at 
the time of the crime, a mental illness deprived them of their relevant 
capacities required for criminal responsibility.9  In theoretical terms, 
insanity is a legal concept, not a medical one.10  While a mental illness 
(disease, defect, or disorder, depending on which terminology is adopted) in 
the clinical sense generally constitutes the “but for” condition of legal 
insanity, it must ultimately satisfy predetermined legal criteria to rise to the 
status of insanity.11  The law is therefore never really interested in mental 
illness as such.  There must certainly be mental illness, but there is always a 
second requirement, namely that the illness be of such form or degree that it 
meets certain legal criteria.12  In sum, it is not a mental illness per se that 
provides grounds for excuse.13  Rather, the determination rests on whether 
 
 9 See Stephen J. Morse & Richard Bonnie, Abolition of the Insanity Defense Violates 
Due Process, 41 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 488, 489 (“Blame and punishment by the 
state are fundamentally unfair and thus a violation of the Due Process Clause if an offender 
was not responsible for his crime. The affirmative defense of legal insanity applies this 
fundamental principle by excusing those mentally disordered offenders whose disorder 
deprived them of rational understanding of their conduct at the time of the crime.”). 
 10 See, e.g., Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Ken Levy, Insanity Defenses, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 299, 300 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 
2011) (observing that “[i]t is common to think that insanity is a medical condition. 
Psychiatrists, however, almost never describe their patients as ‘insane’ or ‘sane.’ . . . It is the 
judges and lawyers who have to decide who is insane and which mental conditions make 
someone insane. The law classifies some people as sane and others as insane in order to 
determine who should be held criminally responsible . . . . In this way, insanity is a legal 
concept.”). 
 11 See, e.g., Paul Robinson, The Effect of Mental Illness Under U.S. Criminal Law, 65 N. 
IRL. LEGAL Q. 229, 230 (2014) (observing that “[i]t is not enough for the defense that an 
actor suffers from a mental disease or defect, even one that causes some dysfunction. To be 
held blameless, the actor’s mental illness must cause effects so strong that it would not be 
reasonable to expect the actor to have avoided the criminal law violation.”). 
 12 HERBERT FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 45 (1972) (clarifying that 
“[w]hen criminal law asks questions concerning mental disease and insanity, it is concerned 
with the defendant’s mental capacities with respect to the law”). 
 13 Belief to the contrary risks giving rise to what Stephen Morse has defined as the 
“fundamental psycho-legal error.” See Morse, supra note 3. 
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the mental disease compromises the person’s capacity to be and act as a 
rational moral agent.14 
The capacity for moral rationality15 constitutes the benchmark of 
culpability and criminal responsibility.16  For agents to be considered 
responsible and therefore deserving of punishment, they must have the 
capacity to adopt a decision and make a choice against a system of moral 
and legal values.17  In fact, the fundamental assumption underlying the ideal 
of punishing only blameworthy agents is that culpable agents are practical 
 
 14 Helen Howard, Diminished Responsibility, Culpability, and Moral Agency, in 
MENTAL CONDITION DEFENCES AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 318, 321 (Ben Livings, 
Alan Reed & Nicola Wake eds., 2015) (“Criminal responsibility will generally require a link 
to moral blameworthiness/culpability . . . . Moral blameworthiness, in addition, presupposes 
that [an individual] is a rational moral agent who has sufficient understanding of his acts and 
deserves moral blame. Therefore, without moral agency there can be no culpability; without 
culpability there should be no criminal responsibility.”); see also Peggy Sasso, Criminal 
Responsibility in the Age of “Mind-Reading,” 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1191, 1193–94 (2009) 
(“[A]n individual who possesses those minimal capacities to qualify as a moral agent . . . is 
capable of engaging in conduct that rejects the community’s moral norms.”). 
 15 There are many definitions of rationality. Also, the meaning of rationality depends on 
the specific field of study, or context, where this concept is used. To avoid conceptual 
confusion, this Article only considers a legal notion of rationality, one which fits the 
purposes of criminal law. See Stephen J. Morse, Rationality and Responsibility, 74 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 251, 252 (2002) (describing [the capacity for moral] rationality as “the ability to 
perceive accurately, to get the facts right, to form justifiable beliefs, and to reason 
instrumentally, including weighing the facts appropriately and according to a minimally 
coherent preference-ordering. Rationality includes the general ability to recognize good 
reasons that should guide action. Put yet another way, it is the ability to act for good 
reasons.”); see also Anthony Duff, Answering for Crime, 106 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 
87, 90 (2006) (likewise asserting that we are responsible agents “insofar as we are capable of 
grasping and being guided by reasons and of answering for ourselves in terms of reasons. 
Responsibility is in play when reasons are in play: we exercise our capacities for responsible 
agency in responding to reasons; we are responsible for such exercises, and for our failures 
to exercise those capacities when we fail to respond to reasons that bear on our thoughts and 
actions.”). 
 16 See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse & Morris Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between Legal 
Insanity and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1071, 
1117 (2007) (“Rationality is the touchstone of criminal responsibility, as the structure of 
criminal law itself indicates. All laws, criminal and civil, make sense and are functional 
precisely because they provide action-guiding reasons addressed to potentially rational 
creatures . . . . It is simply unfair to hold responsible . . . wrongdoers who . . . were not 
capable of being rational at the time of the crime.”). 
 17 Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to 
Responsibility from Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 5 (2008) (“The law properly 
treats persons generally as intentional creatures and not as mechanical forces of nature. Law 
and morality are action-guiding and could not guide people ex ante and ex post unless 
people could use rules as premises in their practical reasoning.”). 
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moral reasoners;18 they are capable of reasoning instrumentally about facts 
as they relate to social, moral, or legal norms and of determining their 
conduct by virtue of normative considerations about what they ought or 
ought not to do.19 
In the eyes of the law, the capacity for moral rationality—or capacity 
for practical moral reasoning—essentially includes two mental prongs: 
cognition and volition.20  The cognitive prong of moral rationality generally 
regards the capacity for understanding, or knowing, the factual and moral 
significance of a given action performed.21  Thus, culpable agents are those 
 
 18 See, e.g., Douglas Husak, “Broad” Culpability and the Retributivist Dream, 9 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 449, 465 (2012) (assuming without argument that reasons to which persons 
must respond in order to become eligible for blame and punishment are indeed moral 
reasons. According to Husak, responding to reasons does not solely mean “ability to 
conform to moral reasons,” but also to “understand the special motivating force of moral 
reasons.”). 
 19 See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Result, and Criminal Responsibility, U. ILL. L. 
REV. 363, 368 (2004) (arguing that “[l]egal and moral rules are not simply mechanistic 
causes that produce “reflex” compliance. They operate within the domain of practical 
reason. Agents are meant to and can only use these rules as potential reasons for action as 
they deliberate about what they should do. Moral and legal rules thus guide actions primarily 
because they provide an agent with good moral or prudential reasons for forbearance or 
action. Unless people were capable of understanding and then using legal rules as premises 
in deliberation, law would be powerless to affect human behavior.”). 
 20 The inclusion of cognition and volition as the essential prongs of the capacity for 
moral rationality has received wide acceptance in various theories of criminal responsibility. 
For instance, Herbert Hart’s capacity-responsibility theory describes the relevant capacities 
necessary for criminal responsibility as “understanding, reasoning and controlling conduct: 
the ability to understand what conduct legal and moral rules require, to deliberate and reach 
decisions concerning these requirements; and to conform to decisions when made.” See 
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 222 
(1967). Endorsing a hybrid version of the character-based and choice-based theories of 
criminal responsibility, Antony Duff similarly holds that “someone who is to be held 
responsible for his choices must at least be capable of recognizing the relevant empirical 
aspects of his actions and its circumstances, and of foreseeing its consequences; he must also 
have the kind of ‘instrumental rationality’ which enables him to determine which actions 
will serve whatever ends he has.” See Robin Antony Duff, Choice, Character, and Criminal 
Liability, 12 L. & PHIL. 345, 356 (1993). Elsewhere, Duff argues that control too is an 
essential prerequisite of criminal responsibility. Control, according to Duff, “is a matter of 
rational capacities: thus I have control over my actions insofar as I have the capacities 
necessary to recognize reasons and guide my actions by them, insofar as I am capable of 
engaging in practical reasoning and of actualizing its results.” See Robin Anthony Duff, Who 
is Responsible, for What, to Whom?, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 441, 452 (2005). 
 21 HERBERT FINGARETTE & ANN FINGARETTE HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY, 224–26 (1979) (claiming that “among members of a community 
there is a certain valuational ‘background nexus’ of basic perception and basic values. 
[Therefore] the basic factual presumption that underlies our expectation that people should 
deliberately [act lawfully] is that each individual in the community shares in a practical 
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who know or can understand what they are doing and the practical 
consequences of their actions, as well as the fact that their actions 
contradict society’s morals.22  On the other hand, volition consists of the 
free exercise of choice of a given course of action among conflicting 
reasons.23  Essentially, volition encompasses the capacity to exert self-
control and resist impulses to engage in certain conduct.24  It follows that 
culpable agents are those who, having conflicting reasons, can do otherwise 
(i.e., they are equipped with the capacity to resist their impulses), but 
simply will not do otherwise and thus choose to act upon their antisocial 
impulses.25 
Critically, the legal understanding of capacity for moral rationality is 
profoundly cognitivist.  Embracing the rationalist view of rational thought 
and behavior—law-abiding and antisocial alike—endorsed by classical and 
neo-classical thinkers,26 contemporary criminal law presupposes that the 
 
awareness of this background-nexus of basic perceptions and basic values. [For instance] 
there is the person who has a practical grasp of the general moral significance of killing, and 
who has the sense that it is . . . an issue of deep concern to the law, and generally 
forbidden—but who may make a personal judgment that a particular unlawful killing is 
acceptable or even desirable. Such a person is rational in regard to the law, even 
though . . . in disagreement with it”). 
 22 Michael Corrado, Responsibility and Control, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 65 (“Only 
those who have a reasonable awareness of the consequences of their actions . . . may be held 
responsible for what they do.”). 
 23 MARK D. WHITE, THE MISTAKEN QUEST FOR A CONTROL TEST: FOR A RATIONALITY 
STANDARD OF SANITY 196 (2017) (“Control (or ‘self-control’) involves the ability to resist an 
immediate desire for the sake of one’s values or long-term goals. For a defendant to claim an 
incapacity for self-control is essentially to assert that, according to his better judgment, he 
did not truly want to commit the crime on the one hand, and his better judgment on the other. 
Without such a tension . . . then no reason exists to assert he experienced a defect of will.”). 
 24 See Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1587 (1994) 
(“‘I couldn’t help myself’; ‘I had no choice’; ‘I couldn’t control myself’; ‘I was forced to do 
it.’ All are common explanations used to support the claim that an agent is not morally or 
criminally responsible for otherwise culpable conduct. The most common criminal law 
‘control’ excuses that instantiate these claims are duress and the so-called ‘volitional’ tests 
for legal insanity.”). 
 25 Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Crime, Punishment, and the Psychology of Self-Control, 
61 EMORY L. J. 501, 515 (2012) (“[A] criminal is a person who deliberately chooses to 
engage in behavior that he knows is wrong; we call this crime because the person could have 
chosen not to engage in the behavior. That is, that person could have exercised self-control 
over his actions and opted for a different choice.”). 
 26 See J. M. Canals, Classicism, Positivism, and Social Defense, 50 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 541, 543 (1960); Clarence Jay Jeffrey, The Historical Development of 
Criminology, 50 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1959) (discussing generally the main 
differences between Classical and Neo-classical schools, and the Positive school of criminal 
law and criminology); Raed SA Faqir, The Philosophy of Punishment: A Study to the History 
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capacity for moral rationality is entirely governed by the powers of 
“reason,” namely the active area of the mind27 that is usually identified with 
cognitive faculties like reasoning, thinking, planning, learning, 
understanding, and the like.28  Thus, contemporary criminal law identifies 
“reason”—qua the only source of the capacity for moral rationality—with 
the cognitive dimension of the mind.  As a synonym for reason and the 
highest function of the mind, cognition (and its related faculties) is what 
drives conscious decision-making, intention-forming, and planning. It is 
also what guides individuals’ practical moral reasoning about what they 
ought and ought not to do.29  Cognition is thus the sole component of the 
legally relevant mind. 
Put yet another way, contemporary criminal law grounds the notion of 
the capacity for moral rationality in rationalist principles to espouse a 
cognitive model of culpability.  As long as individuals display intact 
cognitive faculties, they are presumed to have the capacity to reason 
instrumentally about the factual and moral consequences of their conduct, 
 
of Classical and Positive Schools of Penology, 1 FORENSIC RES. CRIMINOL. INT. J., 1, 3-5 
(2015); KATHERINE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 7–18 (2012). 
 27 Christine M. Korsgaard, The Activity of Reason, 83 PROC. & ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. 
ASS’N 23, 30 (2009) (“The faculty of reason is not identified merely as the ability to 
recognize and respond to reasons. The faculty of reason is identified rather as the active 
dimension of the mind, and rational principles are then identified as those that describe or 
constitute rational activity.”); see also CARLSON ANYANGWE, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL 
PART 249 (2015) (reporting that “[t]he cognitive functions are our intellectual functions, that 
is, our ability to assimilate information from the environment, remember it, organise and 
process it in a rational manner, drawing rational conclusions, and making appropriate 
decisions. Thus, they include our functions of perception, thinking, reasoning, 
understanding, judgement and recall.”). 
 28 FINGARETTE, supra note 12 at 181–82 (describing reason as “that guiding or directing 
faculty of the mind . . . by virtue of which . . . man has traditionally been said to be a 
‘rational being.’” Fingarette holds that “the concept of reason has . . . been taken as the 
key . . . to man’s thinking, to what are called his cognitive capacities”). 
 29 See, e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 83 
(1984) (discussing the relationship between wrongdoing and culpability in the context of 
negligence, he observes that the negligent actor “is . . . capable of calculating what actions 
are likely to lead to what results and even to assign relative probabilities to each. He is, in 
other words, a pre-eminent practical reasoner, finding the morally and legally correct major 
premises . . . and forming the accurate means/end beliefs . . . for his minor premises . . . . It is 
because people have the capacity to reason this way that they can be said to be culpable 
when they do not do so.” He further explains that “[the] failure to make the right cost/benefit 
calculation” makes people culpable only if they have the capacity to reason this way); see 
also ANYANGWE supra note 27 at 249 (“[a] person’s ability to distinguish between right and 
wrong; to know when certain conduct would be wrong according to the standards of law, 
society and/or morality; and to decide on an appropriate course of action, depends on that 
person’s cognitive functions.”). 
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as well as to choose to engage in a given conduct—either right or wrong—
rather than in another.30  As such, they are assumed to be fully accountable 
for their behavior. 
The preeminent role of cognition (and of cognitive faculties) as the 
absolute component of the capacity for moral rationality is markedly 
reflected in insanity standards.  Insanity tests, as is incontrovertibly 
evidenced by the history of conceptions of insanity, are mostly cognition 
based.31  The reason is easy to grasp: if culpability requires that people 
possess a sufficient degree of intellectual capacity to reason instrumentally 
about the factual and moral consequences of engaging in criminal conduct 
and determine their actions accordingly, a lack of culpability can be found 
only when these conditions are not met.  The sub-sections that follow 
explore these claims in more detail.  They do so through an analysis of each 
prong—the cognitive and the volitional—in the most popular insanity tests 
that have been adopted in the United States, namely the M’Naghten rule 
and the American Law Institute (ALI) test.  The purpose is not to conduct 
an in-depth analysis of these insanity standards (the literature is already 
overabundant),32 but simply to highlight the main normative aspects that 
will allow one to deduce the law’s acceptance of an intellectualistic 
understanding of the capacity for moral rationality underlying the insanity 
doctrine. 
A. COGNITION AND THE COGNITIVE PRONG OF INSANITY TESTS 
The strict relationship between capacity for moral rationality and 
cognition can be easily grasped in the cognitive prong of insanity standards.  
To illustrate this relationship, this section analyzes first the formulation of 
 
 30 Glanville Williams, The Criminal Responsibility of Children, CRIM. L. REV. 493, 494 
(1954) (asserting that “the only persons capable of acting wrongly are those of a certain 
intelligence or intellectual accomplishment”). 
 31 See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 750 n.12 (2006) (listing state statutes); infra 
Section I.A and Section I.B. 
 32 See generally Michelle Holtzman, Criminal Insanity – Another M’Naghten?, 23 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 644 (1969); American Bar Association, Insanity Defense, 16 MENTAL & 
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 27 (1992);  JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY, THE ROLE OF MENTAL 
ILLNESS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: THE INSANITY DEFENSE 2 (2001); Lisa A. Callahan et al., The 
Volume and Characteristics of Insanity Defense Pleas: An Eight-State Study, 19 BULL. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 331 (1991); GERBEN MEYNEN, LEGAL INSANITY EXPLORATIONS IN 
PSYCHIATRY, LAW AND ETHICS (2016); Susan Rozelle, Pure Insanity, 42 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 
543 (2009); Paul Robinson & Markus Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief 
Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319 (2007); Norval Morris, Richard Bonnie & Joel Finer, 
Should the Insanity Defense Be Abolished? An Introduction to the Debate, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 
113 (1986–1987). 
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the M’Naghten rule.33  The test contained in it states that insanity exists 
when the following conditions are met: 
[A]t the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under 
such a defect of reason, from disease of [the] mind, as not to know the nature and 
quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was 
doing what was wrong.34 
The cognitivism upon which the rule relies emerges from the 
relationship among “disease of [the] mind,” “defect of reason,” and 
“knowledge.”  The concept of “reason” in the formulation of the 
M’Naghten rule has not been fully explored by criminal law theorists, and 
its meaning remains unclear.35  According to Herbert Fingarette, however, 
the expression “defect of reason” as it is used in M’Naghten clearly refers 
to a defect in the capacity for (moral) rationality.36  He argues that the 
concept of rationality has, for the most part, fallen by the wayside during 
debates on the insanity defense, since the M’Naghten test’s “defect of 
reason” phrase “has not been understood.”37  Fingarette holds that this is a 
“profound mistake [because] the defect-of-reason clause tells us that ‘know 
the nature and quality of the act’ and ‘know that is wrong’ must be taken to 
apply with reference to the person’s . . . capacity for rational conduct.”38 
Accepting this interpretation of the defect of reason as defect of the 
capacity for moral rationality, the intellectualistic substance of this clause 
emerges primarily from the knowledge requirement.  In this respect, Arval 
Morris emphasizes the pivotal function of the word “know,” for it 
“circumscribes the entire test by singling out one aspect of a human being’s 
total personality, the cognitive one.”39  Therefore, Morris continues, “the 
 
 33 The M’Naghten rule has been largely qualified as the product of rationalist 
psychology in vogue at the time it was enacted. See, e.g., Note, Criminal Responsibility and 
Proposed Revisions of the M’Naghten Rule, 32 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 247, 250 (1958) 
(“M’Naghten, it is claimed, is a product of a rationalist era, acknowledging only the 
cognitive or intellectual faculty and does not allow for the incapacity of the will or the 
influence of the emotions.”); see also RUDOLPH JOSEPH GERBER, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 30 
(1984) (asserting that at the time of M’Naghten, “cognition was seen as the highest function 
of the personality. Philosophers searching for the Cartesian dregs of the period expressed the 
notion that the mind controlled bodily behavior like an angel driving a machine.”). 
 34 R. v. M’Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). 
 35 See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Ken Levy, Insanity Defenses, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 299, 306 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 2011). 
 36 FINGARETTE, supra note 12, at 198 (“I believe that ‘a defect of reason’ from ‘disease 
of the mind’ is to be read in paraphrase: ‘substantial defect in capacity for rational conduct’ 
as ‘an endogenous (pathological) condition of mind.’”). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Arval A. Morris, Criminal Insanity, 43 WASH. L. REV. 583, 605 (1968). 
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test is heavily intellectualistic, and from a psychological point of view, 
narrow because the cognitive becomes the single, important criterion of 
criminal responsibility.”40  Likewise, Rudolph Gerber critically observes 
that the term “knowledge” traditionally refers to a verbal or purely 
intellectual assent to a moral proposition.41  The word “know” can therefore 
be interpreted as an appreciation of “the significance of cognitive 
observation, that is, whether the defendant is able to relate what is known to 
the situation at hand and to govern conduct accordingly.”42  In this sense, 
the verb “to know” indicates one’s capacity to be aware of and correctly 
understand certain objective features of behavior.  What is more, as Raider 
notes, courts tend not to define the verb “to know,” and therefore its 
interpretation is left largely to juries’ discretionary common sense.43 
The knowledge requirement circumscribes the meaning of the “disease 
of the mind” clause to encompass only cognitive diseases.  As has been 
observed, courts vary on how they define “disease of [the] mind.”44  Hence, 
a finding of such disease “follows almost automatically” 45 when it is found 
that a defendant was in such a state that he or she did not know the factual 
and moral implications of his or her conduct.46  However, an explicit 
interpretation of the substance of the “disease of the mind” requirement can 
be found in R v. Kemp,47 a case that was heard at the Bristol Assizes in 
1957.  Commenting on the relationship between the “defect of reason” and 
“disease of the mind” requirements, Justice Devlin wrote that “[t]he law is 
not concerned with the brain but with the mind, in the sense that ‘mind’ is 
 
 40 Id. 
 41 Rudolph Joseph Gerber, Is the Insanity Test Insane?, 20 AM. J. JUR. 111, 120 (1975). 
 42 RICHARD BONNIE ET AL., A CASE STUDY IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE: THE TRIAL OF JOHN 
HINCKLEY, JR. 12 (3d ed. 2008); see also ABRAHAM GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 49–
50 (1967). 
 43 Laura Raider, Toward a New Test for Insanity Defense: Incorporating the Discoveries 
of Neuroscience into Moral and Legal Theories, 46 UCLA L. REV. 289, 306 (1998); see also 
James R.P. Ogloff, A Comparison of Insanity Defense Standards on Juror Decision Making, 
15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 509, 526 (1991); NORMAN FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS’ 
NOTIONS OF THE LAW (1995). 
 44 JOHN PARRY, CRIMINAL MENTAL HEALTH AND DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE, AND 
TESTIMONY 336 (2009) (“Under M’Naghten, there must be a ‘disease of the mind.’ This term 
has been interpreted very differently over the years. In its broadest meaning, ‘any 
diagnosable mental disorder’ is sufficient, while under the more narrow interpretation a 
‘severe impairment, usually in the form of psychosis,’ is required.”). 
 45 Richard H. Kuh, The Insanity Defense—An Effort to Combine Law and Reason, 110 
U. PA. L. REV. 771, 785 (1962). 
 46 Id. 
 47 1 QB 399 (1957). For a comment, see J.E. Hall Williams, Defect of Reason from 
Disease of the Mind, 20 MOD. L. REV. 55, 56 (1957). 
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ordinarily used, the mental faculties of reason, memory and 
understanding.”48 
This interpretation of the “disease of mind” requirement is pivotal 
because it underlines the equation of the (legally relevant) mind with 
cognitive faculties.49  Hence, because the rule states that the defect of 
reason (i.e., moral rationality) must derive from a disease of the mind, it 
implicitly assumes that the only mental source of the capacity for moral 
rationality is cognition.  Consequently, only purely cognitive defects are 
considered capable of giving rise to irrational behavior.  As Gerber more 
precisely describes it, it is only “when cognition is defective the personality 
as a whole is so impaired that the accused cannot ‘know’ the wrongfulness 
of his actions.”50  Thus, a legally relevant disease of the mind cannot but be 
a cognitive disease, such as pure psychosis. 
The test contained in the M’Naghten rule has given rise to several 
controversies over the years.  On the one hand, some specialists in criminal 
law have been staunch defenders of the test and maintained that it is 
fundamental to the notions of moral blame and retribution.51  On the other 
hand, mental health specialists, supported by some legal scholars and 
practitioners, have held that the M’Naghten test is obsolete and 
unscientific52 and “not only bad science but unsound law.”53  Critics 
holding this view have relied upon the fact that cognitive or intellectual 
integrity is not sufficient to account for a person’s knowledge of the 
wrongfulness of the act he or she is about to perform and the ability to 
control himself or herself.54  In other words, the intellectual test contained 
in the rule is too narrow to encompass the entire scope of legal insanity. 
 
 48 R v. Kemp, 1 QB at 399 (emphasis added). 
 49 See FINGARETTE, supra note 12, at 144 (“[T]he M’Naghten test deals with only one of 
the mind’s three ‘functions,’ the cognitive function.”). 
 50 Gerber, supra note 41, at 119. 
 51 See, e.g., Jerome Hall, Responsibility and Law: In Defense of the McNaghten Rules, 
42 A.B.A. J. 917 (1956). 
 52 See Simon E. Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law: From M’Naghten to Durham, 
and Beyond, 41 A.B.A. J. 793, 877 (1955) (“The M’Naghten rule requires medical witnesses 
to testify in terms that to them are artificial and confining . . . When [a doctor] is forced to 
adopt the vocabulary of morality and ethics, he is speaking in what to him is a foreign 
language . . . .”). 
 53 Kuh, supra note 45, at 782. 
 54 See, e.g., Carl Cohen, Criminal Responsibility and the Knowledge of Right and 
Wrong, 14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 30, 43 (1959) (“The emphasis upon knowledge as the test of 
responsibility is indicative of what is perhaps the underlying misconception of the 
McNaghten rule—that the cognitive capacities can be singled out, among mental 
phenomena, as the proper determinants of sanity and responsibility. Although we do, for 
purposes of analysis, distinguish the cognitive, conative, and affective aspects of mental life, 
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To fill the gaps and shortcomings of the M’Naghten rule, in 1962 the 
ALI introduced a new insanity standard in the MPC.55  The MPC’s 
formulation is based on the assumption that insanity should be grounded in 
a broader understanding of cognition, and a reference to volitional 
incapacity should be included explicitly in the formulation of the defense.56  
The broadening of the cognitive prong of legal insanity has resulted in the 
dismissal of the verb “to know” and the simultaneous adoption of the 
broader verb “to appreciate.”57  This term has, however, caused interpretive 
confusion because it is unclear how broadly it should be understood.58  
According to some authors, the term “appreciate” has been introduced to 
allow the inclusion of the emotional capacity to perceive the wrongfulness 
of one’s conduct.59  Others have held that this broader understanding of the 
verb “to appreciate” is merely ostensible, and that it still refers to a purely 
cognitive capacity to propositionally understand the meaning of one’s 
conduct.60 
This stricter cognition-based interpretation is confirmed by the so-
called “caveat paragraph” of the test, which explicitly rules out “any 
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial 
 
it is an error to assume, as the McNaghten rule does, that these aspects of experience can be 
separated to the extent that one alone—the cognitive—is the index of mental health. The 
actual mental experience of persons, well or sick, cannot be broken up so neatly into its 
constituents. We can no longer assume that reason, or cognition, is the only—or even the 
prime—regulator of conduct. That the human personality is an integrated unity, in the 
direction of which all of the modes of experience play some part is now a commonplace. 
The point is that people may be brought, by insane emotion or compulsion, to do what they 
themselves know to be wrong. Yet that faculty psychology already discussed, so prevalent in 
the nineteenth century, has colored, through the McNaghten opinions, the legal standards of 
the present day.”). 
 55 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
 56 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 57 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (“A person is not responsible for 
criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he 
lacks substantial capacity . . . to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.”). 
 58 See Kuh, supra note 45, at 797–98 (asserting that the words ‘substantial’ and 
‘appreciate’ “were intentionally chosen for their imprecision”). 
 59 RITA J. SIMON & DAVID E. AARONSON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A CRITICAL 
ASSESSMENT OF LAW AND POLICY IN THE POST-HINCKLEY ERA 37–39 (1988). 
 60 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 42, at 88. Also, the cognitive nature of the verb “to 
appreciate” emerges from the explanatory notes of Section 4.01 of the Model Penal Code: 
“An individual’s failure to appreciate the criminality of his conduct may consist in a lack of 
awareness of what he is doing or a misapprehension of material circumstances, or a failure to 
apprehend the significance of his actions in some deeper sense.” THE AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE OFFICIAL DRAFT AND EXPLANATORY NOTES, PART I. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 62 (1985). 
18 COPPOLA [Vol. 109 
conduct from the notion of mental disease or defect.”61  The reference, as 
has been claimed, is to those categories of subjects with impaired emotional 
faculties and marked tendencies to engage in antisocial conduct, such as in 
the case of psychopaths.62 
B. COGNITION AND THE VOLITIONAL PRONG OF INSANITY TESTS 
The volitional prong of insanity standards is surely more controversial 
than the cognitive one.  As noted above, volition essentially means free 
exercise of choice among conflicting courses of action, with distinct sets of 
reasons.63  In substantial capacity doctrines, such as insanity, volition 
fundamentally equates to the capacity for self-control.64  Unlike the 
cognitive prong, however, the volitional prong of insanity standards is both 
conceptually and epistemologically troublesome. 
Conceptually, it is not clear what the capacity or incapacity for self-
control actually means, nor is there a unanimous consensus about it among 
philosophers, legal scholars, and legal practitioners.  Unlike cognitive 
capacity or incapacity, volitional capacity or incapacity results in a 
doubling of a person’s personality, meaning that normality and abnormality 
coexist in the same person, between which it is incredibly difficult to 
conceptualize a dividing line.65  In other words, it is not clear when a 
person cannot resist an impulse or simply will not resist an impulse.  As a 
consequence, from an epistemological perspective, the major reasons for 
the skepticism surrounding the issue of whether lack of self-control should 
be taken into account as an autonomous prong of insanity range from 
difficulty in assessing and quantifying self-control, to practical difficulty in 
differentiating lack of self-control from poorly planned or impulsive acts.66 
Based on these limitations, many scholars, and the law itself, endorse 
the view that the capacity for self-control ultimately depends on the 
cognitive faculties of knowledge or understanding.67  In other words, if the 
 
 61 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
 62 See RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY IN LAW/LAW IN PSYCHIATRY 197 (2d ed. 2009). 
 63 See supra notes 23–24. 
 64 See supra note 24. 
 65 A remarkable attempt has been made by Michael Moore, who has provided a folk-
psychological account of volitional capacity and excuse. See Michael S. Moore, The 
Neuroscience of Volitional Excuse, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND 
NEUROSCIENCE 179 (Dennis Patterson & Michael S. Pardo eds., 2016). 
 66 GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A 
HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 216 (3d ed. 2007). 
 67 See, e.g., Jerome Hall, Mental Disease and Criminal Responsibility - M’Naghten 
Versus Durham and the American Law Institute’s Tentative Draft, 33 IND. L.J. 212, 213–14 
(1958) (“The second point that I think we must hold on to is the relationship between 
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capacity for moral rationality means the ability to determine (i.e., know, be 
aware of, understand, and so forth) the factual, social, and moral value of a 
given action, it simultaneously consists of the ability “not to act [and, thus, 
to exert self-control] if doing so is known to be wrong.”68  Thus, by 
presuming that the capacity for self-control depends on people’s prior 
knowledge of the factual and moral significance of their actions, criminal 
law implicitly accepts that the source of self-control lies in cognitive 
faculties.69 
The view of self-control as a faculty depending on knowledge—which 
is expressed in the ancient legal maxim nihil volitum nisi praecognitum 
(nothing is desired unless it is first known)—is manifest in the history of 
insanity standards.  To begin, the M’Naghten test includes only a cognitive 
prong in that it roots the grounds for insanity in the possession of the 
cognitive capacity to know the nature and quality of one’s act and that the 
act is wrong.70  As Gerber observes, “The [M’Naghten] rule assumes that if 
an individual ‘knows’ right from wrong, his rational powers are intact and 
that he is, therefore, capable of governing his conduct.”71  Similarly, Snyder 
claims that “an offender who knows what he does, knows that it is 
wrong . . . and coolly and carefully prepares what he does, can and does 
control his action right up to the moment of commission.”72  Thus, although 
a volitional prong is not explicitly provided, it is implicitly derived from the 
cognitive one. 
 
intelligence and the control of conduct. If we look about us and visualize the magnificent 
structures of science and legal systems and ethics, we attribute these great achievements to 
man’s capacity for thought, to human understanding. Can we then allow psychiatrists or any 
other specialists to persuade us that human understanding has no effective relationship to the 
commission of the serious harms that are the concern of criminal law? It seems to me that 
we should ask for evidence and a great deal of evidence before we accept the irrationalism 
that one’s reason may be unimpaired and that nonetheless it exercises no control over such 
conduct.”). 
 68 JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 167 (2d ed. 1960). To put it 
into an example: if A knows that shooting B will kill B, and A knows that the act of killing 
is wrong, then A is supposed to refrain from shooting B because of this 
knowledge/awareness, both factual and normative. 
 69 To put it into an example: A is intelligent, A’s intelligence enables him to know what 
stabbing B means, and therefore A willfully chooses to stab, or prevents himself from 
stabbing B, based on this knowledge. 
 70 R. v. M’Naghten 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). 
 71 GERBER, supra note 33, at 30. 
 72 Orvill C. Snyder, Criminal Responsibility, 1962 DUKE L.J. 204, 209 (1962); see also 
Kuh, supra note 45, at 782 (“As man is an ‘integrated personality,’ his knowledge, his will, 
and his ability to act are all intertwined. The word ‘know,’ as used in McNaughton, can be 
taken to mean not only the ability to perceive by use of the senses and intellect, but the 
ability to guide or control one’s action in the light of this perception.”). 
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As has also been noted, the M’Naghten rule has been harshly criticized 
by scholars and practitioners of criminal law who have emphasized the 
extreme narrowness of the sole cognitive test.73  These critiques have led 
some United States jurisdictions, in an effort to counter the excessive 
restrictiveness of the M’Naghten rule, to adopt the “irresistible impulse 
test”74—today abandoned—and, many years later, the ALI test.75  Focusing 
solely on the latter, the ALI standard defines the capacity for self-control as 
“the capacity to conform behavior to what the law requires.”76  Under this 
new definition, lack of self-control occurs when individuals cannot (or find 
it impossibly difficult) act as the law requires, regardless of whether or not 
they know they should behave as the law prescribes. 
Despite its initial popularity, today only a few states continue to apply 
the ALI test.77  Public outcry78 after the verdict in United States v. 
Hinckley79 led to subsequent legislation that narrowed the insanity defense 
by removing the volitional defense theory.80  In 1983, the American 
Psychiatric Association released a statement arguing that volitional tests 
may be unnecessary because defendants who meet the exculpatory criteria 
set forth in volitional tests will usually meet the exculpatory criteria for 
cognitive impairment tests as well.81  In the wake of that statement, as of 
 
 73 See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text. 
 74 See Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373, 378 (1897); Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 
866–67 (Ala. 1877); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 502 (1844). 
 75 MODEL PENAL CODE (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 76 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
 77 See American Academy of Psychiatry and Law, AAPL Practice Guideline for 
Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation of Defendants Raising the Insanity Defense, 42 J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. S3, S66 (2014). 
 78 The Associated Press, Hinckley Acquittal Brings Moves to Change Insanity Defense, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1982, at D21. 
 79 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 80 CHARLES PATRICK EWING & JOSEPH T. MCCANN, MINDS ON TRIAL: GREAT CASES IN 
LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY 99 (2006) (“[F]ederal and state legislators were busy revising or 
abolishing insanity laws in an effort to make sure that another Hinckley verdict would never 
occur.”). 
 81 American Psychiatric Association, Statement on Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 681, 685 (1983) (“The line between an irresistible impulse and an impulse not 
resisted is probably no sharper than that between twilight and dusk . . . . The concept of 
volition is the subject of some disagreement among psychiatrists. Many psychiatrists 
therefore believe that psychiatric testimony (particularly that of a conclusory nature) about 
volition is more likely to produce confusion for jurors than is psychiatric testimony relevant 
to a defendant’s appreciation or understanding.”). However, the APA retired this position in 
2008. See Donna Norris, Reports to Membership, 165 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1214, 1214 (2008) 
(“The sixth position statement, Insanity Defense, replaced the statement approved in 1982 
and updated it with a more concise and up-to-date formulation. This more concise position 
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1984 the ALI test was largely discarded in favor of the Insanity Defense 
Reform Act (IDRA):82 the first federal codification of the insanity defense 
that was introduced with the explicit purpose of removing the volitional 
component from the ALI standard. 
Today, a minor number of US jurisdictions employ the “control” 
test.83  The majority of them remain mired in a view that the only viable 
basis for a plea of insanity is a mental disease or disorder that has led to 
cognitive impairment resulting in an incapacity to know, understand, or 
appreciate the factual, moral, social, or even legal significance of one’s 
conduct.84  Lack of self-control is assessed indirectly as a possible further 
consequence of cognitive defects.85  Therefore, if individuals are 
cognitively able to know right from wrong and their rational powers are 
 
statement is aimed at underscoring APA support for a meaningful insanity defense without 
endorsing any particular standard.”). 
 82 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1984) (“Affirmative defense: It is an affirmative defense to a 
prosecution under any Federal Statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts 
constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was 
unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or 
defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.”); see Stephen J. Morse, Insanity Defense 
Reform Act (IDRA), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 374 (Brian L. Cutler ed., 
2008). 
 83 See Paul H. Robinson & Tyler Scott Williams, Mapping American Criminal Law: 
Variations Across the 50 States - Ch. 14 Insanity Defense, U. PA. FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP 
1718 (2017) [http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1718]. 
 84 Id. 
 85 See Paul Litton, Is Psychological Research on Self-Control Relevant to Criminal 
Law?, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 725, 730–31 (2014) (commenting on the relationship between 
the psychological conception of self-control and the understanding of self-control that is 
implicit in cognitive tests, he observes that “[a]n agent has the requisite control over her 
conduct, and is thus sane, if she has the capacity to understand the nature and moral quality 
of her conduct.” Using the famous example of Andrea Yates—who, while suffering from 
psychotic delusions, killed her five children—he observes that “[if we] stipulate that Yates 
had a very strong desire not to kill her children and that she fought against this desire 
because she believed that the morally best action was to kill her children . . . then Yates 
would have exercised self-control; however, she could still be judged insane under 
M’Naghten if she did not know her acts were wrong. The conception of control implicit in 
cognitive insanity standards is distinct from the kind of self-control under [psychological] 
study.”). See also Yates v. State, 171 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. App. 2005); for comments on Yates 
case and the relationship between cognitive and volitional prongs, see generally Brian D. 
Shannon, The Time is Right to Revise the Texas Insanity Defense: An Essay, 39 TEXAS TECH. 
L. REV. 67 (2006); Christine Michalopoulos, Note, Filling in the Holes of the Insanity 
Defense: The Andrea Yates Case and the Need for a Volitional Prong, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 383 (2003); Melinda Carrido, Revisiting the Insanity Defense: A Case for Resurrecting 
the Volitional Prong of the Insanity Defense in Light of Neuroscientific Advances, 41 SW. L. 
REV. 309, 322–23 (2012). 
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intact, then it follows that they are capable of controlling their own conduct.  
Altogether, they do not meet the criteria to be eligible for legal insanity. 
II. THE NEGLIGIBLE ROLE OF EMOTIONS 
Criminal law’s adherence to a cognitivist model of legal insanity finds 
further support in the lack of consideration of emotions within the essential 
components of the capacity for moral rationality—and hence of 
culpability.86  While there is a long-standing dispute among scholars from 
different disciplines about the exact meaning of emotion,87 this Article 
addresses an understanding of emotion adopted by criminal law.  The 
answer is intuitive. Criminal law’s view of emotion is rationalist and folk 
psychological.88  Under the folk—and rationalist—conception, emotions 
mostly take on negative connotations, in that they are viewed as contrasting 
with intellect, and therefore may only undermine rational moral behavior.89  
Simply put, in criminal law “emotions are thought to be irrational, 
involuntary, and animal-like, whereas . . . intellect is rational, voluntary, 
and distinctly human.”90 
 
 86 As has been discussed, the legal understanding of the capacity for moral rationality is 
essentially based on the fusion of cognition and volition. See supra Part I. 
 87 See, e.g., Klaus R. Schrerer, What Are Emotions? How Can They Be Measured?, 44 
SOC. SCI. 695, 696 (2005) (“The concept of ‘emotion’ presents a particularly thorny 
problem. Even though the term is used very frequently, to the point of being extremely 
fashionable these days, the question ‘What is an emotion?’ rarely generates the same answer 
from different individuals, scientists or laymen alike.”); see also Ronald deSousa, Emotion, 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotion/ 
[https://perma.cc/RVX9-RJXL] (illustrating the different views about the functions and the 
ontology of emotions); John Deigh, Concepts of Emotions in Modern Philosophy and 
Psychology, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF EMOTION 17 (2009) (illustrating 
the different conceptions of emotions either as affective states or as cognitive states); Paul 
Kleinginna & Anne M. Kleinginna, A Categorized List Of Emotion Definitions, With 
Suggestions For a Consensual Definition, 5 MOTIV. EMOT. 345 (1981). 
 88 Folk psychology can be defined as the natural tendency human beings have to express 
and describe the behavior of others on the basis of the possessing mental states (intentions, 
desires, beliefs, etc), by using common linguistic terms. Criminal law heavily embodies folk 
psychological accounts of human behavior. See, e.g., Katrina Sifferd, Translating 
Neuroscientific Evidence into the Language of the “Folk,” in NEUROSCIENCE AND LEGAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 183, 191 (Nicole Vincent ed., 2010) (explaining that “criminal law grounds 
the assessment of responsibility on behavioral evidence, and behavioral evidence is likely to 
directly trigger attribution of mental states required by the legal criteria for guilt or not 
guilt.”). 
 89 Commonplace idioms reveal this bias: “Keep a cool head;” “Keep your emotions at 
bay;” or “Do not let your passions interfere with your reason.” 
 90 NORMAN FINKEL & GERROD PARROT, EMOTIONS AND CULPABILITY: HOW THE LAW IS 
AT ODDS WITH PSYCHOLOGY, JURORS, AND ITSELF 53 (2006). 
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This rationalist and commonsense-based understanding of emotions 
adopted by criminal law is what Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum call the 
“mechanistic conception”91 of emotions.  Under the mechanistic 
conception, emotions have a negative effect on reasoning and self-control,92 
as they are forces that do not contain or respond to thought.93  As such, 
emotions are not part of the mental states that comprise moral rationality 
and do not play any positive role within morally rational decision-making.  
Rather, emotions are treated as irrational occurrences that may distort moral 
reasoning and potentially destabilize moral decision-making by preventing 
people from selecting the adequate means to achieve their goals, therefore 
negatively affecting their self-control.94 
While embracing this perspective, criminal law excludes the emotional 
dimension of the mind from having any significant relevance for the mental 
preconditions of culpability.  As Norman Finkel and Gerrod Parrot note, 
“[t]he folk category of emotion can appear to threaten the orderly rule of 
law, for it carries with it the irrationality of primate impulses and the 
indeterminacy of subjective states.  These perceived threats account for 
why the Law omits emotion in favor of more cognitive criteria. . . .”95 Also, 
as the two authors suggest, the general reluctance to properly address 
emotion is linked to the law’s effort to avoid subjective rules, standards, 
 
 91 See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal 
Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 275–95 (1996). 
 92 See id. at 273. 
 93 Id. at 278–79 (“[E]motions . . . are energies that impel the person to action, without 
embodying ways of thinking about or perceiving objects or situations in the world . . . . 
Emotions feel like things that sweep over us, or sweep us away, or invade us often without 
our consent or control . . . .”). 
 94 The other conception of emotion is the evaluative conception. See Kahan & 
Nussbaum, supra note 91, at 273 (explaining that under the evaluative conception “emotions 
express cognitive appraisals, that these appraisals can be morally evaluated, and that persons 
can and should shape their emotions through moral education”). Kahan and Nussbaum 
actually defend an idea that even though the law’s language may suggest a view of emotions 
that is distinctively primitive, bodily, and mechanical, its logic actually suggests an 
evaluative understanding of emotions. Speaking about rage, the two authors maintain that 
rage is mitigating not because of a mechanical loss of control but because rage expresses 
values that are proper in the situation. In other words, it is conceivable that the law expresses 
understanding of emotion’s cognitive aspects, even if it draws on non-cognitive metaphors 
to describe it. I disagree with this view. While the premises of Kahan’s and Nussbaum’s 
reasoning are logical and certainly correct (emotions are evaluative and cognitive, and 
should be considered as such by the law), I am not inclined to think that criminal law 
actually takes the evaluative perspective into account. As it emerges from normative texts 
and their dominant interpretations, the view that emotions are in opposition to cognition and 
self-control is manifest. 
 95 See FINKEL & PARROT, supra note 90, at 48. 
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and judgments as much as possible.96  Therefore, the law opts for “more 
mechanical, physical, bodily aspects of everyday emotion language.”97 
Despite criminal law’s firmness in denying emotion a positive role in a 
person’s capacity for moral rationality, some commentators do recognize 
that the presence or absence of emotional capacities or states should be 
weighed in the evaluation of the substantial capacities necessary for 
responsibility.98  However, as Raider notes, “although some of these 
theorists acknowledge a richer conception of rationality than pure 
instrumental reasoning, including a limited role of emotions, they stop short 
of including all of the relevant capacities.”99  Indeed, even when emotions 
are thought of as relevant components, they are still treated as a quid pluris 
and still on a distinct and minor level to that of cognition and rationality.100 
The neglected positive role of emotion in moral rationality is manifest 
in culpability doctrines and particularly in the insanity doctrine.  The 
absence of emotions from the substance of legal insanity emerges from a 
twofold position: 1) no insanity standard provides for an emotional capacity 
test, that is, a test measuring a defendant’s capacity to emotionally 
appreciate the moral significance of his or her action; and 2) insanity 
standards infer volitional incapacity only from cognitive impairments, not 
emotional ones: emotional disturbance affecting self-control is considered 
only in diminished-capacity doctrines. 
A. “MORAL INSANITY” AND THE LACK OF AN EMOTIONAL CAPACITY 
TEST 
In 1835, the Bristolian physician Dr. James Cowles Prichard described 
moral insanity as “a form of mental derangement, a morbid perversion of 
the feelings, affections, and active powers without any illusion or erroneous 
conviction impressed upon the understanding: it sometimes co-exists with 
an apparently unimpaired state of intellectual faculties.”101  Prichard’s 
 
 96 Id. at 83. 
 97 Id. 
 98 See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 614–
15 (1997); Stephen J. Morse, Brain and Blame, 84 GEO. L.J. 527, 543 (1996); Peter 
Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship between Legal 
and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511 (1992). 
 99 Raider, supra note 43, at 293. 
 100 For example, Stephen Morse qualifies emotions as one of the protective variables 
that also might help the agent to be in control. Yet, Morse places them on a distinct and 
independent level compared to rationality. See Morse, supra note 24, at 1607–08. 
 101 JAMES COWLES PRICHARD, A TREATISE ON INSANITY AND OTHER DISORDERS 
AFFECTING THE MIND 20 (1835). Also, Cesare Lombroso adhered to Prichard’s theory of 
moral insanity to complete his theory of the criminal man. Moral insanity, along with 
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description presents a view of people suffering from moral insanity as being 
impaired in their inclinations, tempers, habits, moral dispositions and 
natural impulses, but without any remarkable disorder or defect of the 
intellect or reasoning faculties, and particularly without any illusion or 
hallucination.102 
Presently, the concept of moral insanity has become synonymous with 
socio-affective disorders, such as antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), 
narcissistic personality disorder (NPD) and, above all, psychopathy.103  
Although appearing in different forms, these disorders share emotional 
deficits and an increased disregard for other individuals which can be 
expressed through a tendency to engage in violent and aggressive 
conduct.104  People suffering from these disorders do not exhibit any 
significant deficit in the cognitive functions of knowledge and 
understanding.105  Psychopathy represents the most emblematic example.  
Although there is a growing consensus that psychopathy should be classed 
as a mental disorder, criminal law treats psychopaths as paradigmatic 
culpable agents.106  The reason is simple: psychopaths’ intellectual faculties 
 
atavism and epilepsy, forms a universal trait of criminal subjects. See CESARE LOMBROSO, 
CRIMINAL MAN 188 ([3d ed. 1884] transl. by Mary Gibson & Nicole Hahn Rafter, 2006). 
 102 PRICHARD id. at 16. 
 103 According to the nosographic description contained in the DSM-5, Antisocial 
Personality Disorder is characterized by a pervasive pattern of disregard for the rights of 
other people, which often manifests as hostility, aggression, or both. Deceit and 
manipulation are also central features. People with Narcissistic Personality Disorder have 
significant problems with their sense of self-worth stemming from a powerful sense of 
entitlement. This leads them to believe that they deserve special treatment and to assume that 
they have special powers, are uniquely talented, or are especially brilliant or attractive. Their 
sense of entitlement can lead them to act in ways that fundamentally disregard and disrespect 
the worth of those around them. Psychopathy, on the other hand, is a mental disorder 
featured by marked emotional dysfunctions, limited capacity for moral judgments, and 
recidivistic offending. Psychopathy is not officially recognized as a personality disorder. It is 
not even included in the DSM-5, nor is there a unanimous opinion among psychiatrists and 
psychologists as to whether psychopathy should be qualified as a disorder at all. Attempts to 
define psychopathy as an autonomous kind of disorder and provide specific items to identify 
it have been made primarily by Dr. Robert Hare, who authored the Psychopathy Checklist 
Revised in 1990. As described in the checklist, psychopathy encompasses traits typical to 
both ASPD (e.g., lack of impulse control) and NPD (e.g., grandiose sense of self-worth). See 
Robert Hare et al., The Revised Psychopathy Checklist: Reliability and Factor Structure, 2 
PSYCHOL. ASSESS.: J. CONSULT. CLIN. PSYCHOL. 338, 339 (Table 1) (1990). 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 See Stephen J. Morse, Psychopathy and Criminal Responsibility, 8 NEUROETHICS 
205, 207 (2008) (“The law does not excuse psychopaths, even those whose psychopathy is 
clear and severe. Psychopathy is not a legally sufficient basis to raise an insanity defense or 
any other excuse.”). 
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are substantially intact; psychopaths are intelligent enough to know the 
facts, have no misperception of reality, and understand that there are rules 
and consequences for violating them.107  What they lack is “simply” 
empathy, regret, guilt, or more generally, prosocial emotions and 
feelings.108  Even if psychopaths display significant emotional 
abnormalities, they are never legally excused for their criminal actions.109  
Rather, their condition may even lead to harsher sentences.110 
The first and fundamental reason for excluding subjects suffering from 
severe socio-affective deficits—such as psychopathy—from the range of 
eligible candidates for the insanity defense lies in the law’s limited regard 
of emotional faculties within the evaluation of the capacity for moral 
rationality.111  As such, deficits in the emotional faculties—however 
pathological—are not considered to sufficiently affect an individual’s 
capacity for moral rationality.112   As long as individuals possess intact 
intellectual faculties, and thus demonstrate substantive instrumental 
reasoning faculties and competent use of them, a possible deficiency in 
emotional faculties does not affect their culpability.113 Quite the contrary, 
these characteristics appear to symptomize an intense form of “evil” which 
deserves even harsher punishment.114 
The second, and consequential, reason for excluding socio-affective 
deficits from the host of conditions eligible for the insanity defense is that 
they—however pathological—do not meet traditional insanity standards, 
which admit no relevance for emotional capacities.  While standards such 
as the M’Naghten rule do not consider emotional capacity at all, the MPC 
seems to admit the lack of emotional capacity has some relevance.115  As 
noted above, however, this acceptance is ostensible.116 
 
 107 Id. at 208. 
 108 See Hare, supra note 103. 
 109 See Morse, supra note 106, at 208. 
 110 Id. at 207–08. 
 111 See supra Part II. 
 112 See supra Part II. 
 113 See supra Part II. 
 114 See, e.g., John F. Edens et al., Psychopathy and the Death Penalty: Can the 
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised Identify Offenders Who Represent ‘A Continuing Threat to 
Society’?, 29 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 433, 458–63 (2001); Stephen D. Hart, Psychopathy, 
Culpability, and Commitment, in MENTAL DISORDER AND CRIMINAL LAW 159, 168–69 
(Robert F. Schopp et al. eds., 2009); Christina Lee, Judicial Response to Psychopathic 
Criminals: Utilitarianism over Retribution, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 125, 127–32 (2007). 
 115 See HALL supra note 68, at 169 (“The use of ‘appreciate’ rather than ‘know’ conveys 
a broader sense of understanding than simple cognition.”). 
 116 See PARRY, supra note 44, at 311 (observing that “while the notion of appreciation of 
criminal conduct is distinguishable from the more narrow [sic] conception of knowing right 
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These claims find further confirmation in the second paragraph of the 
MPC test (the “caveat paragraph”), specifying that the notion of mental 
disease or defect does not include repeated manifestations of criminal or 
otherwise antisocial conduct.117  As previously noted, this provision was 
introduced with the explicit purpose of excluding psychopaths and, more 
broadly, patients suffering from socio-affective disorders from the range of 
eligible candidates for insanity defense.118  As Schopp observes: 
Th[e] requirement [of emotional awareness] . . . would seem to exculpate the cold 
or vicious criminal who victimizes innocent people without experiencing 
sympathy or remorse. Yet, the insanity defense certainly is not intended to 
exculpate such criminals. Rather, these are just the people that the criminal law—
and the prison system—are designed to deter.119 
As can be noted, the rationale for excluding emotionally deficient 
perpetrators also lies in safeguarding public safety needs.  Extreme forms of 
moral deviancy are considered symptomatic only of particularly dangerous 
personalities: the kinds that are very likely to harm society repeatedly.120  
There is consequently a tendency—in criminal law as well as in common 
understanding—to qualify patients suffering from pathological socio-
affective deficits as iconic wrongdoers, as “evil” individuals who constantly 
and willingly reject and break the rules of societal coexistence.121  As such, 
 
from wrong contemplated by the M’Naughten rule, the ALI model still emphasizes the 
offenders’ cognition of the criminality of their acts. In practice, the ALI model continues to 
rely upon instrumental reasoning capacities”). 
 117 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (“As used in this Article, the 
terms ‘mental disease or defect’ do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated 
criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.”) 
 118 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1962); see also SLOVENKO, supra 
note 62. 
 119 ROBERT SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 33 (1991). 
 120 See Edens, supra note 114. 
 121 See. e.g., Maria Isabel Gonzalez-Tapia et al., A New Legal Treatment for 
Psychopaths? Perplexities for Legal Thinkers, 54 INT. J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 46, 47 (2017) 
(“Psychopathy . . . represents archetypes of ‘evil’, of incorrigible criminals, for whom a 
retributive culpability-based punishment is not enough and a consequentialist 
‘dangerousness-based’ legal response would be required.”); William Waller, “Criminal” 
Insanity & Public Morality, 4 WASH. U. JUR. REV. 183, 190–91 (2011) (observing that 
sociopaths [meaning people suffering from antisocial personality disorder] are not good 
candidates for the insanity defense, even if on the literal terms of a majority of permutations 
it ought to apply. Apart from self-selection, sociopaths can be handled routinely under the 
criminal law because their mental illness is, diagnostically speaking, behavioral . . . Because 
the defense serves to control retribution . . . society has enough reservation with applying the 
defense outside of situations where the accused possesses certain overt, graphic, 
physiological characteristics. Faced with a disorder defined only in terms of a tendency 
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they fully deserve blame and punishment, as well as the kind of criminal 
incapacitation that curbs their antisocial tendencies while keeping society 
safe. 
B. LACK OF SELF-CONTROL AND EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE 
As discussed above, criminal law is mostly insensitive to whether a 
defendant is in control at the time of the crime, unless this lack of control is 
the result of a mental disease affecting his or her cognitive faculties of 
knowledge and understanding.  Conversely, the legal relevance of an 
incapacity for self-control that is linked to emotional impairments does not 
suffice for exculpation.  While criminal law accepts that emotions may 
overturn reason and control, emotions do not do so to the point of providing 
grounds for insanity and blamelessness. 
This view has its foundations in the folk-legal conception that 
emotions are not essential for moral rationality.122  Rather, emotions are 
mental states that can and should be defeated by rational powers.123  As 
phrased by Finkel and Parrott, “in the Law’s folk psychology theory as well 
as in its normative expectations, there is the belief that control over one’s 
emotions is psychologically possible and normatively expected.”124  Thus, 
although criminal law treats emotions as mental states that may override 
reason and self-control, if a defendant acts under strong emotional 
influence—however pathological in nature—this condition is not treated as 
the kind of moral rationality defect that might exculpate him or her. 
While lack of self-control due to emotional impairments cannot 
ground a total excuse, there are a few cases in which criminal law allows 
for mitigation due to lack of self-control resulting from an emotional 
breakdown.  Among them, the most emblematic are the mitigating 
conditions in common law’s “heat of passion”125 and the MPC’s EED 
defenses.126  Both mitigations constitute specific forms of diminished 
 
toward antisocial behavior, however, and of which sufferers are sensationalized as evil, 
society will revert to its baseline of the criminal sanction . . . .”). 
 122 See supra Section II. 
 123 See supra Section II. 
 124 See FINKEL & PARROT, supra note 90, at 137. 
 125 See Reid Griffith Fontaine, Adequate (Non)Provocation and Heat of Passion as 
Excuse Not Justification, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 27, 29–30 (2009) (observing that under 
the Provocation/ Passion partial excuse, “the defendant must demonstrate that (a) he was 
adequately provoked, (b) as a direct result of said provocation, he became emotionally 
charged such that he lost self-control, (c) not enough time to ‘cool off’ passed between 
provocation and killing, and (d) he did not, in fact, cool off prior to killing his victim(s)”). 
 126 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (AM. LAW. INST. 1962). The EED is a codified 
and expanded version of the Heat of Passion doctrine which—despite its greater 
2019] MOTUS ANIMI IN MENTE INSANA 29 
capacity127 that bring substantially lower penalties.  It is important to 
outline that such mitigation is only available for reducing murder to 
manslaughter and not for any other crime.128  Thus, if a person commits any 
crime other than homicide in a state of emotional disturbance, he or she is 
not able to raise this kind of defense at the trial stage to obtain a reduction 
of penalty.129 
Both the EED and the heat of passion doctrines are based on the 
commonsense-based intuition that persons in extreme emotional conditions 
generally do not intend and cannot control very much of anything.130  That 
is, when there is strong emotion there cannot be deliberation.  Based on this 
intuition, the law at least grants mitigation by recognizing that people who 
kill while in a state of extremely heightened emotion—with or without prior 
 
narrowness—still remains the most largely mitigating doctrine adopted by U.S. jurisdictions. 
Like the heat of passion standard, the EED standard allows that murder be reduced to 
voluntary manslaughter if the defendant, due to an extreme emotional breakdown, acted in 
an uncontrollable rage. Unlike heat of passion, however, the core component of the 
mitigation is that the killing must have been committed “under the influence of an extreme 
emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation and excuse,” regardless of 
whether the defendant was provoked or not. Therefore, “any affective experience sufficient 
to disable a person’s ‘usual intellectual controls’ or scrambles ‘normal rational thinking’ 
counts as an extreme emotional disturbance”. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206 
(1977); People v. Casassa, 404 N.E. 2d 1310 (N.Y. 1980). 
 127 See Paul Robinson, Abnormal Mental State Mitigations of Murder – The U.S. 
Perspective, in LOSS OF CONTROL AND DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY: DOMESTIC, 
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 291 (Alan Reed & Michael Bohlander eds., 
2011) (claiming that this mitigation is actually misleadingly referred to as diminished 
capacity or partial responsibility, in that it only negates the existence of an element of the 
crime but does not indicate reduced culpability or responsibility). 
 128 Uri Moaz & Gideon Yaffe, What Does Recent Neuroscience Tell Us About Criminal 
Responsibility?, 3 J. L. & BIOSCIENCE 120, 136 (2016) (asserting that the reason why the law 
makes the EED mitigation available only for homicide lies in the fact that homicide is “a far 
less common crime than many others. This indicates the rather stingy attitude in the law 
towards basing differences in treatment on differences in control.”). 
 129 Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM L. 289, 296 (2003) (“Why should these doctrines be limited to homicide? For example, 
suppose a defendant acting in the heat of passion intentionally burns the provoker’s property, 
rather than killing the provoker. Or suppose that an agent suffering from a non-culpable state 
of substantially diminished rationality commits arson. Some arsonists and some criminals 
generally might act with non-culpable, substantially impaired rationality that does not meet 
the standards for a full legal excuse. Compromised rationality and its effect on culpability 
are not limited to homicide. Fairness and proportionality require that doctrinal mitigation 
should be available in all cases in which culpability is substantially reduced.”). 
 130 See Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense? Some Reflections on a 
Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 959 n.5 (2002) (“Provocation law is all about 
emotions.”). 
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provocation, depending on the standard—are less than fully in control of 
what they are doing. 
An analysis of the doctrine of diminished capacity demonstrates an 
unequal treatment of lack of self-control due to emotional impairments, as 
compared to treatment of lack of control linked to cognitive defects. 131 In 
line with this Article’s thesis, the reason for this disparity is that cognition 
is considered to be the only essential source of moral rationality.  Therefore, 
when cognitive faculties are impaired, a person can lose the capacity to 
control himself or herself and might be excused.  Emotion, however, is 
viewed as the opposite of intellect and is thus not constitutive of the mental 
makeup of moral rationality.  It follows that when there is no proof of a 
cognitive or intellectual defect, there is no space for a volitional excuse on 
the basis of emotional impairment alone.  In the absence of a cognitive or 
intellectual defect, emotional impairment is simply not enough to satisfy the 
law. 
III. EMOTIONS, MORALITY, AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR: INSIGHTS FROM 
NEUROSCIENCE 
As illustrated previously, criminal law tends to deny emotions a 
positive role within the capacities for moral rationality that an individual 
must possess in order to be potentially criminally culpable.  While the 
notion of culpability, and hence of culpability-related doctrines such as 
insanity, revolve around the sphere of cognition, emotions are mostly 
treated as sudden occurrences that can provoke a temporary distortion in an 
individual’s capacity for practical moral reasoning.132  Unlike cognitive 
dysfunctions, emotional impairments are not treated as symptomatic of 
moral rationality defects.133 Thus, emotional faculties receive no 
prominence in the substance of legal insanity. 
The following sub-sections highlight that the legal overreliance on the 
sphere of cognition, as well as the marked disregard of emotions in the 
capacity for moral rationality, are empirically inaccurate.  They do so by 
measuring the legal paradigm of the capacity for moral rationality against 
the neuroscientific (and behavioral) literature about the brain and the mental 
dynamics that underpin moral judgment and decision-making, and 
antisocial behavior.  The aim here is not to conduct an exhaustive literature 
review of this body of neuroscientific studies.  Rather, and more narrowly, 
it is to use relevant scientific literature to highlight the foremost mistaken 
 
 131 See discussion supra Section I.B. 
 132 See discussion supra Section II. 
 133 Id. 
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legal-psychological assumptions emerging from the legal understanding of 
the capacity for moral rationality and, consequently, from insanity tests.  
First, “emotion” is as critical as “cognition” in moral decision-making and 
behavior.  Second, the capacity for self-control does not necessarily depend 
on intellectual faculties of knowledge and understanding.  Rather, self-
control abilities depend on the balanced relationship between cognitive and 
emotional processes, both of which are critical in mediating and regulating 
our impulses and behavior.  This dependence entails that a disruption in 
either the emotional or cognitive processes involved in self-control are 
equally capable of endangering one’s controlled choice of behavior.  Thus, 
one can retain perfect factual and moral knowledge or understanding 
capacities, yet remain incapable of making adaptive choices or controlling 
one’s impulses. 
A. “KNOWING” WITHOUT “FEELING” HAS A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON 
MORAL JUDGMENT AND DECISION-MAKING 
The word “emotion” comes from the Latin ex (out) + movere (to 
move).134  Its etymology is consistent with its core function, namely that 
emotions compel people to act and motivate them to act in a given way.135 
Psychologists and neuroscientists have developed numerous theories of 
emotions in order to understand the particular rationality of emotional 
reactions.  These theories come in many varieties, but they largely impugn 
the view that emotions are mere primitive states that only distort 
reasoning.136  Rather, they share the idea that emotions—both basic137 and 
moral138—provide critical guidance in reasoning and decision-making 
processes. 
 
 134 Emotion, English Oxford Living Dictionaries, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com 
/definition / emotion  [https://perma.cc/GQ6G-BEYL] (last visited June 16, 2018). 
 135 Rene Rosfort & Giovanni Stanghellini, How Do You Feel? Why Emotions Matter in 
Psychiatry, 20 J. PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 381, 385 (2014) (“Emotions are the lived motivation 
for movement. Emotions are kinetic, dynamic forces that drive us in our ongoing 
interactions with the environment.”). 
 136 See Jennifer Lerner et al., Emotion and Decision Making, 66 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 
799 (2015); Elizabeth Phelps et al., Emotion and Decision Making: Multiple Modulatory 
Neural Circuits, 37 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 263 (2014). 
 137 The category of basic emotions covers a disputed territory. By and large, basic 
emotions are discrete mental states including primitive emotions like happiness, sadness, 
fear, anger, and the like. See Paul Ekman, Basic Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF COGNITION AND 
EMOTION 45 (Tim Dalgleish & Mick J. Power eds., 1999). 
 138 Moral emotions (also referred to as social emotions) differ from basic emotions, for 
they are intrinsically linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or of 
persons other than the agent. See Jonathan Haidt, The Moral Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF 
AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 852 (Richard Davidson, Klaus Sherer, and H. Hill Goldsmith eds., 
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According to most accredited scientific accounts, emotions serve a 
variety of functions within decision-making and behavior.  First, and 
foremost, emotions have an appraisal (or evaluative) function:139  that is, 
when people receive or perceive inputs (or stimuli, or events) from the 
environment, emotions act to provide meaning and value to the information 
being processed, and thus act as strong influences in pursuing appropriate 
behavior in response to that appraised information.  Importantly, emotional 
appraisals strongly influence cognitive functions.140–141  Second, emotions 
are motivational states.142  Upon perception and appraisal of external 
stimuli, emotions help people select responses and thus motivate their 
behavior in responding to stimuli in an appropriate way.143  Third, emotions 
are adaptive:144 they help people prioritize and organize their behavior in 
ways that optimize their adjustment to the demands of the physical and 
social environment.  Thus, emotions modulate people’s behavioral 
responses by appropriately tuning their decisions to the demands or 
opportunities offered by the environment, thereby allowing them to 
 
2003); see also Kathryn F. Jankowski & Hidehiko Takahashi, Cognitive Neuroscience of 
Social Emotions and Implications for Psychopathology: Examining Embarrassment, Guilt, 
Envy, and Schadenfreude, 68 PSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 319 (2014) (“Social 
emotions are affective states elicited during social interactions and integral for promoting 
socially appropriate behaviors and discouraging socially inappropriate ones.”). 
 139 See generally MAGDA ARNOLD, EMOTION AND PERSONALITY (1960); Richard S. 
Lazarus, Thoughts on the Relation Between Emotion and Cognition, 37 AM. PSYCHOL. 1019 
(1982); Klaus R. Scherer, Neuroscience Findings are Consistent with Appraisal Theories of 
Emotion; But Does The Brain “Respect” Constructionism?, 35 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 163 
(2012). 
 140 See Zhong Lin-Lu & Barbara Anne Dosher, Cognitive Psychology, 2 SCHOLARPEDIA 
2769 (2007) (explaining that in neuroscience, cognitive functions refer to cerebral activities 
that lead to knowledge, including all means and mechanisms of acquiring information. 
Cognitive functions encompass reasoning, memory, learning attention, and language and 
lead directly to the attainment of information and, thus, knowledge). 
 141 Mark D. Lewis & Rebecca M. Todd, Getting Emotional: A Neural Perspective on 
Emotion, Intention, and Consciousness, 12 J. CONSCIOUS STUD. 210, 212 (2005) (“[T]he 
biological function of emotion is to impel appropriate behavior, given past learning and 
precedent circumstances, by steering attention toward useful options for acting on the world 
and urging one to pursue them. Thus, cognition in general . . . is assumed to be guided by 
emotional relevance.”). 
 142 LAMBERT DECKERS, MOTIVATION: BIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL 367–98 (3d ed 2009); NICO H. FRIJDA, Emotions and Action, in FEELINGS 
AND EMOTIONS 158–73 (Antony S.R. Manstead, Nico Frijda & Agneta Fisher eds., 2004). 
 143 FRIJDA, supra note 142 at 158–73; see also Carroll E. Izard, Emotion Theory and 
Research: Highlights, Unanswered Questions, and Emerging Issues, 60 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 1 (2009). 
 144 Datcher Keltner & James J. Gross, Functional Accounts of Emotions, 13 COGNITION 
& EMOTION 467 (1999). 
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effectively apply the decision to take action.145  Lastly, emotions are 
regulatory: they regulate the maintenance of internal bodily integrity, such 
that an organism can be prepared for specific reactions.146  Thus, emotions 
regulate bodily responses by prompting specific reactions to external 
inputs.147 
Importantly, neuroscientific studies suggest that emotions play their 
guiding role in decision-making at both subconscious and conscious 
levels.148  For a long time, an individual’s emotional life was generally 
understood as a subconscious phenomenon belonging solely to the 
subcortical regions, the most primitive regions of the brain (notably, the 
limbic structures such as the amygdala),149 while cognition was attributed to 
the highly developed, neocortical regions (notably, the prefrontal cortex 
[PFC]).150   As such, scientific research long endorsed the view that the 
high functions of reasoning and decision-making were solely served by 
cognitive faculties.151  
 
 145 Id. at 470 (“Emotions are adaptations to problems in the current human 
environment.”). 
 146 See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND EMOTIONS IN 
THE MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 39 (1999) (asserting that emotions are part of the regulation 
of one’s homeostasis, i.e. “the coordinated and largely automated physiological reactions 
required to maintain steady internal states in a living organism”). For example, when we are 
confronted with a threatening situation, the negative emotion of fear puts our brain and our 
body out of balance, for it provokes physiological changes such as rapid heartbeat and 
breathing. While provoking physiological changes, fear will predict the threat and prompt us 
to respond to and cope with that threat, and thus regain homeostasis by adjusting its 
physiological processes. 
 147 Id. 
 148 See supra note 8. 
 149 See, e.g., James W. Papez, A Proposed Mechanism of Emotion, 79 ARCHIVES 
NEUROLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 725 (1937). 
 150 See W. Gerrod Parrott & Jay Schulkin, Neuropsychology and the Cognitive Nature of 
the Emotions, 7 COGNITION & EMOTION 43 (1993). 
 151 See, e.g., Joseph E. LeDoux, Emotions Circuits in the Brain, 23 ANN. REV. 
NEUROSCIENCE 155, 156 (2000) (“Why did research on the brain mechanisms of emotion 
come to a halt after midcentury? . . . For one thing, emotion research was a victim of the 
cognitive revolution. The emergence of cognitive science shifted the interest of those 
concerned with the relation between psychological functions and neural mechanisms toward 
processes [perception and memory, for example] that were readily thought of in terms of 
computer-like operations . . . . Another factor that hindered work on emotions in 
neuroscience was that the problem of how the brain makes emotions seemed to have been 
solved in the early 1950s by the limbic system concept . . . . This appealing and convincing 
theory was the culmination of research on the brain mechanisms of emotion by many 
researchers, extending back to the late nineteenth century . . . . Studies of how the brain 
mediates cognitive processes seemingly had a long way to go to catch up with the deep 
understanding that had been achieved about emotions, and researchers flocked to the new 
and exciting topic of cognition and the brain to begin filling the gap.”). 
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In contrast to this outdated perspective, more recent studies have 
expanded the conception of the scope of the “emotional brain.”152  In 
particular, these studies have supported the view that emotional processes 
also involve significant participation of the neocortical regions—notably, 
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VmPFC) and the orbitofrontal cortex 
(OFC).153  Studies on the neocortical dimension of emotional processes 
have led neuroscientists to also maintain a strong interrelation between 
cognitive and emotional processes in decision-making.154  One crucial 
insight emerging from this line of research is that emotional and cognitive 
processes involved in decision-making often engage overlapping neural 
mechanisms.155  Therefore, there is not a clear-cut distinction between 
“emotion” and “cognition” in decision-making processes in the brain, but 
“emotion” and “cognition” are strictly intertwined and they equally 
contribute to the production of decisions and behavior as a consequence. 
Considering the significant involvement of emotion-related brain 
circuits in decision-making tasks, neuroscientists have come to attribute a 
fundamental role to emotions, when paired with cognitions, in helping to 
guide decision-making and behavioral outcomes.  As Elizabeth Johnston 
and Leah Olson have suggested, “[t]he so called ‘cognitive’ brain functions, 
such as attention, perception, learning and memory, and decision-making 
can no longer be seen as separate and distinct from emotions; instead, they 
are inextricably infused with emotional assessments and feelings that 
accompany them.”156  In a nutshell, the neuropsychological sciences have 
largely rejected the view that emotions are necessarily “disturbing factors” 
 
 152 See, e.g., Don Tucker et al., Anatomy and Physiology of Human Emotion: Vertical 
Integration of Brainstem, Limbic, and Cortical Systems, in HANDBOOK OF THE 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTION 56 (Joan C. Borod ed., 2000). 
 153 See infra 189–95. 
 154 See, e.g., ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: REASON, EMOTION, AND THE 
HUMAN BRAIN 54–79 (1994); Jennifer Lerner et al., Emotion and Decision-Making, 66 ANN. 
REV. PSYCHOL. 799, 802–11 (2015); Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Emotion and Decision 
Making: Multiple Modulatory Neural Circuits, 37 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 263, 267–81 
(2014); Megan Speer & Mauricio Delgado, Emotion-Cognition Interactions in Memory and 
Decision-Making, in STEVEN’S HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND 
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 591, 596–605 (John Wixed & Eric Jan Wagermakers eds, 2018). 
 155 See Richard J. Davidson, Cognitive Neuroscience Needs Affective Neuroscience (and 
Vice Versa), 42 BRAIN & COGNITION 89, 91 (2000) (“Cognition would be rudderless without 
the accompaniment of emotion, just as emotion would be primitive without the participation 
of cognition.”). 
 156 ELIZABETH JOHNSTON & LEAH OLSON, THE FEELING BRAIN: THE BIOLOGY AND 
PSYCHOLOGY AND EMOTIONS 307 (2015). 
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for decision-making or that emotions can possibly be factored out of the 
decision-making processes. 157 
The influential role of emotions in guiding deliberations and behavior, 
as well as the strict interrelation between emotional and cognitive functions 
in decision-making processes, have been further contextualized in moral 
judgments.  A growing body of behavioral literature has consistently 
indicated that emotions—most notably, certain moral emotions158—are the 
core driving force of the deliberative processes involved in moral 
judgments.159  By and large, moral emotions help people recognize and 
appreciate the moral value of given morally salient stimuli (e.g., good or 
bad, right or wrong).160  Based on this evaluation, moral emotions motivate 
and orient people’s reactions to those stimuli and consequently help them 
adapt decisional and behavioral responses.161  Ultimately, moral emotions 
profoundly influence one’s “adherence (or lack of adherence) to moral 
standards.”162 
Different moral emotions convey different information about various 
perceived events and shape moral judgments by prioritizing different socio-
moral concerns.163  Hence, moral emotions affect moral decisions and 
behavior in varying ways.164  For example, some studies have shown the 
 
 157 Id. 
 158 Notwithstanding the various classifications that have been proposed, moral emotions 
are by and large classified in four main categories: self-conscious moral emotions (including 
guilt, shame, embarrassment, and pride); other-condemning emotions (anger, disgust, 
contempt); other-praising emotions (love, elevation); other-suffering emotions (compassion). 
See Haidt, supra note 138. 
 159 See infra notes 165–63. 
 160 See Dacher Keltner et al., Emotions as Moral Intuitions, in AFFECT IN SOCIAL 
THINKING AND BEHAVIOR 161, 164–68 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2006). 
 161 See Rimma Teper et al., How Emotions Shape Moral Behavior: Some Answers (and 
Questions) for the Field of Moral Psychology, 91 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 
1, 5 (2015) (“Within the past decade, psychologists have theorized about the ways in which 
these emotions might drive moral decision making, in both their real and anticipated 
forms . . . . For instance, people might be motivated to relieve the pre-decisional negative 
affect (e.g. guilt), avoid post-decisional anticipated negative affect (e.g. shame), or achieve 
post-decisional positive affect . . . . In other words, moral emotions can provide both the 
information and motivational force to do the ‘right thing’ . . . .”). 
 162 See June Price Tangney et al., Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior, 58 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 345, 347 (2007). 
 163 See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Horberg et al., Emotions as Moral Amplifiers: An Appraisal 
Tendency Approach to the Influences of Distinct Emotions upon Moral Judgment, 3 
EMOTION REV. 237, 238 (2011). 
 164 Id. 
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crucial relevance of guilt,165 in combination with other-oriented empathy, in 
inhibiting antisocial impulses and promoting prosocial behavior.166  Other 
work has connected compassion to concerns about caring for and reducing 
harm to others, particularly those in need.167  Compassion is aroused by 
perceptions of the need, suffering, or weakness of others, and motivates 
prosocial action even if it is costly to the self.168  Research has found that 
compassion prominently shapes moral judgments of harm and care.169 
Other studies have instead focused on the relationship between moral 
judgments and empathy.170  Notwithstanding the lack of a unanimous 
definition of empathy, it can be defined as a multi-dimensional171 socio-
affective process consisting of “gaining information about the internal 
affective representations of others,”172 thereby eliciting vicarious emotional 
responses.173  Although the way empathy—and, notably, each of its 
components, namely emotional sharing, perspective-taking, and empathic 
concern174—interacts with and influences morality is debated,175 convincing 
 
 165 See June P. Tangney et al., Shame, Guilt and Remorse: Implications for Offender 
Populations, 22 J. FORENS. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 706 (2011). 
 166 See Linda Torstveit et al., Empathy, Guilt Proneness and Gender: Relative 
Contributions to Prosocial Behaviour, 12 EUR. J. PSYCHOL. 260, 265–66 (2016); Jeffrey 
Stewing et al., Shaming, Blaming, and Maiming: Functional Links Among the Moral 
Emotions, Externalization of Blame, and Aggression, 44 J. RES. PERSONALITY 91 (2010). 
 167 See, e.g., Helen Y. Weng et al., The Role of Compassion in Altruistic Helping and 
Punishment Behavior, 10 PLOS ONE 1, 12 (2015). 
 168 Jennifer L. Goetz et al., Compassion: An Evolutionary Analysis and Empirical 
Review, 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 351, 356 (2010). 
 169 See id. at 354. 
 170 See generally infra notes 177–76. 
 171 See Mark H. Davis, Measuring Individual Differences in Empathy: Evidence for a 
Multidimensional Approach, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 113 (1983). 
 172 See Giuseppe Ugazio et al., Are Empathy and Morality Linked? Insights from Moral 
Psychology, Social and Decision Neuroscience, and Philosophy, in EMPATHY AND 
MORALITY 155, 161 (Heidi Maibom ed., 2014). 
 173 See Nancy Einseberg et al., Empathy-Related Responding: Associations with 
Prosocial Behavior, Aggression, and Intergroup Relations, 4 SOC. ISSUES & POL’Y REV. 143 
(2010). 
 174 Emotional sharing (sometimes referred to as empathic arousal or emotional 
contagion) reflects the natural capacity to become affectively aroused by others’ emotions. 
Perspective-taking is the ability to consciously put oneself into the mind of another 
individual and imagine what that person is thinking or feeling. Empathic concern 
corresponds to the motivation of caring for another’s welfare. Critically, neuroscientific 
research suggests that each of these facets of empathy emerges from specific neurobiological 
processes—both emotional and cognitive. Thus, it is very likely that each empathy facet 
uniquely influences moral cognition and predicts differential outcomes in moral behavior. 
See, e.g., Raeanne C. Moore et al., Distinct Neural Correlates of Emotional and Cognitive 
Empathy in Older Adults, 232 PSYCHIATRY RES.: NEUROIMAGING 42 (2015); Sylvia Morelli 
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evidence exists supporting the claim that empathy does have an overall 
bearing on moral judgments.176  Especially concerning other individuals, 
empathy promotes caregiving behavior, and it also leads to aversions to 
violence.177 
Some authors have suggested a particularly key role for “empathic 
concern”—that is, the motivation of caring for another’s welfare—in 
informing moral judgments, for empathic concern is largely involved in 
altruistic behavior in response to someone in distress.178  Studies using the 
“trolley dilemma,”179 an iconic experiment in moral philosophy, have 
indicated that people with low levels of empathic concern are more likely to 
endorse utilitarian solutions to personal moral dilemmas: solutions that 
require personally harming someone in order to achieve the greater good.180  
Importantly, neuroscientific studies testing this hypothesis have related 
empathic concern to activity in the amygdala and the VmPFC that, as 
 
et al., The Neural Basis of Empathy for Components of Empathy: Predicting Daily Prosocial 
Behavior, 9 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 39 (2014); Jamil Zaki & Kevin N. 
Ochsner, The Neuroscience of Empathy: Progress, Pitfalls, and Promise, 15 NATURE 
NEUROSCIENCE 675 (2012). 
 175 See, e.g., Jean Decety & Jason M. Cowell, Friends or Foes: Is Empathy Necessary 
for Moral Behavior?, 9 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 525, 530 (2015). 
 176 See, e.g., Jamil Zaki, Empathy is a Moral Force, in ATLAS OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 
49 (Kurt Gray & Jesse Graham eds., 2018); Geert-Jan Will & Eduard T. Klapwijk, Neural 
Systems Involved in Moral Judgment and Moral Action, 34 J. NEUROSCIENCE 10459 (2014); 
Keith Yoder & Jean Decety, The Neuroscience of Morality and Social Decision-Making, 24 
PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 279 (2018); Fang Cui et al., Moral Judgment Modulates Neural 
Responses to the Perception of Other’s Pain: An ERP Study, 6 SCI. REP. 1 (2016). 
 177 See Jean Decety & Jason M. Cowell, Empathy, Justice, and Moral Behavior, 6 AJOB 
NEUROSCIENCE 3 (2015); see also Ugazio et al., supra note 172, at 165 (noting that 
“[e]mpathy, by eliciting feelings of approbation or disapprobation, can be used to decide 
whether an action should be considered morally right or wrong . . . . Furthermore, by making 
a person aware of the emotional state of others, empathy can motivate people to judge and 
eventually act accordingly. For instance, if someone is in a negative emotional state as a 
result of another person’s actions, for example, feels pain after being hit by another person, 
empathy may motivate an observer to judge that hitting others is morally wrong and, by 
extension, may motivate him to help the victim.”). 
 178 See, e.g., Oriel FeldmanHall et al., Empathic Concern Drives Costly Altruism, 105 
NEUROIMAGE 347, 352–54 (2015). 
 179 Judith Jarvis Thomson, Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem, 59 THE 
MONIST 204 (1976). 
 180 Ezequiel Gleichgerrcht & Liane Young, Low Levels of Empathic Concern Predict 
Utilitarian Moral Judgment, 8 PLOS ONE e60418 (2013); Indrajeet Patil & Giorgia Silani, 
Reduced Empathic Concern Leads to Utilitarian Moral Judgments in Trait Alexithymia, 5 
FRONT. PSYCHOL. 501 (2014); Liane Young et al., Damage to Ventromedial Prefrontal 
Cortex Impairs Judgment of Harmful Intent, 65 NEURON 845 (2010). 
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discussed in more detail shortly, are key brain regions of the socio-
emotional circuitry involved in moral judgments. 
The insights into the relationship among moral emotions, empathy, 
and moral judgments are further complemented by neuroscientific advances 
regarding the neural correlates181 of moral judgment and decision-making.  
While brain scans alone cannot exactly determine which emotions are at 
stake in moral judgments and decision-making, studies using neuroimaging 
techniques “have consistently implicated those brain regions implicated in 
emotional processing, including moral emotion processing.”182–183  
Importantly, the growing body of these studies has led several 
neuroscientists to indicate the existence of a “neuromoral network,”184 a 
network of brain areas that appear to be constantly and significantly 
involved in moral judgment and decision-making.  According to the 
prevailing view, the best-replicated neural correlates of morality broadly 
recruit a fronto-temporo-subcortical network, and therefore comprise both 
cognitive and emotional components.185  The “cognitive” components of 
the moral circuit are mainly localized in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
 
 181 Neural correlates can be defined as the neuronal mechanisms that correspond with—
i.e., correlate directly with—a particular experience. For instance, research refers to the 
neural correlates of consciousness as “the minimum neural mechanisms sufficient for any 
one specific conscious percept.” See Christof Koch et al., Neural Correlates of 
Consciousness: Progress and Problems, 17 NAT. REV. NEUROSCI. 307 (2016). 
 182 James Blair & Katherine Fowler, Moral Emotions and Moral Reasoning from the 
Perspective of Affective Cognitive Neuroscience: A Selective Review, 2 EUR. J. DEV. SCI. 
303, 314 (2008). 
 183 Jorge Moll et al., Frontopolar and Anterior Temporal Cortex Activation in a Moral 
Judgment Task: Preliminary Functional MRI Results in Normal Subjects, 59 ARQ 
NEUROPSIQUIATR 657 (2001); Jorge Moll et al., Functional Networks in Emotional Moral 
and Nonmoral Social Judgments, 16 NEUROIMAGE 696 (2002); Joshua Greene et al., An 
fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment, 293 SCIENCE 2105 (2001); 
Joshua Greene et al., The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral 
Judgment, 44 NEURON 389 (2004). 
 184 See Mario F. Mendez, The Neurobiology of Moral Behavior: Review and 
Neuropsychiatric Implications, 14 CNS SPECTR. 608 (2009); Leo Pascual et al., How Does 
Morality Work in the Brain? A Functional and Structural Perspective of Moral Behavior, 7 
FRONT. INTEGR. NEUROSCIENCE 1 (2013); Kristine Prehn & Hauke Heekeren, Moral 
Judgment and the Brain: A Functional Approach to the Question of Emotion and Cognition 
in Moral Judgment Integrating Psychology, Neuroscience and Evolutionary Biology, in THE 
MORAL BRAIN: ESSAYS ON THE EVOLUTIONARY AND NEUROSCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF MORALITY 
129 (Johan Braeckman, Jan Verplaetse & Jelle De Schrijver eds., 2009); Joshua Greene & 
Jonathan Haidt, How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?, 6 TRENDS COGN. SCI. 517 
(2002). 
 185 See Mendez, supra note 184, at 608–09. 
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(DLPFC)186 and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC);187 the “emotional” 
components of the moral circuitry instead involve the amygdala,188 the 
OFC,189 and notably the VmPFC,190 which is also thought of as the 
“integrative center for innate morality.”191  The latter areas support specific 
affective aspects of moral judgment and decision-making, including 
emotional perception, sensitivity to reward and punishment, and 
motivation, especially in so-called “care-based morality.”192 
Roughly, studies suggest that the socio-emotional mechanism involved 
in moral judgment and decision-making goes as follows: perceived or 
received morally salient stimuli are first processed at the sub-cortical level 
by certain structures of the limbic system, in particular the amygdala.193  
Upon receiving a stimulus, the amygdala attaches either a positive or a 
negative emotional valence to it (e.g., good or bad), which is represented as 
an outcome valence within the VmPFC and the OFC.194  The VmPFC 
“mediates automatic moral and ‘prosocial’ reactions, such as discomfort at 
the prospect of being a direct agent of a personal moral violation or of harm 
to someone else,”195 thereby becoming very active in moral emotions that 
are positively linked to prosocial behavior, such as guilt or compassion.  
 
 186 See Kristine Prehn et al., Individual Differences in Moral Judgment Competence 
Influence Neural Correlates of Socio-Normative Judgments, 3 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE 
NEUROSCIENCE 33 (2008). 
 187 Id. 
 188 See James Blair, The Amygdala and the Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex in Morality 
and Psychopathy, 11 TRENDS COGN. SCI. 387 (2007). 
 189 See Pascual, supra note 184. 
 190 See Blair, supra note 188; Liane Young & Michael Koenigs, Investigating Emotion 
in Moral Cognition: A Review of Evidence from Functional Neuroimaging and 
Neuropsychology, 84 BRIT. MED. BULL. 69 (2007); Chuanpeng Hu & Xiaoming Jiang, An 
Emotion Regulation Role of Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex in Moral Judgment, 8 FRONT. 
HUM. NEUROSCI. 873 (2014). 
 191 Donatella Marazziti et al., The Neurobiology of Moral Sense: Facts or Hypotheses?, 
12 ANNALS GEN. PSYCHIATRY 6 (2013). 
 192 See Blair, supra note 188 (describing care-based morality as “those forms of moral 
reasoning that concern actions that harm others”). 
 193 See, e.g., Pascual, supra note 184; Amitai Shenhav & Joshua Greene, Integrating 
Moral Judgment: Dissociating the Roles of the Amygdala and Ventromedial Prefrontal 
Cortex, 34 J. NEUROSCI. 4741 (2014); Manuela Fumagalli & Alberto Priori, Functional and 
Clinical Neuroanatomy of Morality, 135 BRAIN (2006). 
 194 See, e.g., Pascual, id.; Liane Young & Michael Koenigs, Investigating Emotion in 
Moral Cognition: A Review of Evidence from Functional Neuroimaging and 
Neuropsychology, 84 BR. MED. BULL. 69 (2007); Abigail A. Marsh et al., Reduced 
Amygdala-Orbitofrontal Connectivity during Moral Judgments in Youths with Disruptive 
Behavior Disorders and Psychopathic Traits, 194 PSYCHIATRY RES. 279 (2011). 
 195 Mendez, supra note 184, at 610. 
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Also, the VmPFC attributes moral and emotional values to social stimuli, 
anticipates their future outcome, and modulates the mechanisms of 
empathy196 and perception of others’ intentions.  While the VmPFC serves 
mostly an evaluative function in the processing of emotional stimuli, the 
OFC serves the function of filtering emotional stimuli, dampening arousal 
to irrelevant inputs, and maintaining neural focus on task-relevant 
associations.197  In so doing, the OFC mediates aversive responses related 
to the social context, modifies responses based on feedback, and inhibits 
automatic behavior triggered by the amygdala. 
The critical role of socio-emotional brain circuits in moral judgment 
and decision-making has received further support in lesion studies.  For 
instance, Sobhani and Bechara198 indicated that anatomical lesions to and 
dysfunctions of the VmPFC and its reciprocal connections with the 
amygdala appear to lead to a lack of empathic concern, a diminished sense 
of guilt and inappropriate social behavior.  In a study on VmPFC patients, 
Koenigs et al.199 administered personal and non-personal moral dilemmas 
tests to VmPFC-damaged patients.  While these patients provided the same 
utilitarian responses to non-personal harm dilemmas as the control subjects, 
they showed a far more marked utilitarian reasoning in personal moral 
dilemmas, compared to the control subjects.200  In addition to confirming 
the crucial role of the VmPFC in attaching emotional valences to moral 
considerations, these researchers also observed that normal utilitarian 
reasoning in impersonal dilemmas confirms that VmPFC patients retain 
intact cognitive intellectual abilities.201  Likewise, Mario Mendez et al.202 
confirmed the crucial role of the VmPFC in moral judgment and decision-
making.  They found that patients with frontotemporal dementia, who are 
characterized by a lack of empathic concern and likelihood to engage in 
 
 196 See supra note 181. 
 197 Joshua Knabb et al., Neuroscience, Moral Reasoning, and the Law, 27 BEHAV. SCI. 
L. 219, 221 (2009). 
 198 Mona Sobhani & Antoine Bechara, A Somatic Marker Perspective of Immoral and 
Corrupt Behavior, 6 SOC. NEUROSCI. 640, 640–41 (2011). 
 199 Michael Koenigs et al., Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex Increases Utilitarian Moral 
Judgments, 446 NATURE 908 (2007). 
 200 Id. at 910 (“VMPC patients’ judgements differed from comparison subjects’ only for 
the high-conflict personal moral dilemmas, all of which featured competing considerations 
of aggregate welfare on the one hand, and, on the other hand, harm to others that would 
normally evoke a strong social emotion. Low-conflict personal moral scenarios lacked this 
degree of competition.”). 
 201 Id. (“[T]he current results suggest that the VMPC is a critical neural substrate for the 
intuitive/affective but not for the conscious/rational system.”). 
 202 Mario Mendez et al., An Investigation of Moral Judgement in Frontotemporal 
Dementia, 18 COGN. BEHAV. NEUROL. 193 (2005). 
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antisocial conduct, also tended to favor the utilitarian action in personal 
moral dilemmas.203 
Additional support for this view has been provided by neuroimaging 
studies conducted on psychopathic individuals.204  Raine and Yang205 
reviewed and integrated literature on moral reasoning and antisocial 
behavior to trace a neural moral model of antisocial behavior with a focus 
on psychopathy.  Interestingly, their study found that the key brain areas 
that are either structurally or functionally impaired in patients suffering 
from psychopathy (e.g., the VmPFC or the amygdala) correspond to those 
being part of the socio-emotional circuitry of the neuromoral network (i.e., 
areas that are significantly involved in emotional processing, including 
moral emotion processing).206  Impairments in these brain areas seem to 
explain why patients affected by this type of disorder show severe empathy 
deficits (notably, a lack of empathic concern), callousness or emotional 
flatness, and deficiencies in using emotional information to regulate their 
behavior and to respond to other individuals’ distress.207  Importantly, 
individuals with psychopathy do seem to retain a “cognitive” understanding 
of moral and legal wrongs.208  However, as one study indicated, 
psychopaths treat the word “wrong” in a purely conventional way, as if it 
 
 203 Id. at 195–96 (“The FTD patients differed in the way they responded to an 
emotionally based ‘personal’ moral dilemma compared with the AD patients and normal 
control subjects. The FTD patients retained knowledge of moral rules and norms and could 
reason about the right and wrong of a situation. In contrast, they appeared to have 
diminished emotional identification with others and solved moral dilemmas in an impersonal 
fashion.”). 
 204 The neuroscientific literature on psychopathy is very wide. See generally KENT A. 
KIEHL & WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, HANDBOOK ON PSYCHOPATHY AND LAW (2013); 
Kent A. Kiehl et al., Limbic Abnormalities in Affective Processing by Criminal Psychopaths 
as Revealed by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 50 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 677 (2001); 
R.J.R. Blair, Responding to the Emotions of Others: Dissociating Forms of Empathy 
Through the Study of Typical and Psychiatric Population, 14 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGN. 698 
(2005); Yaling Yang et al., Morphological Alterations in the Prefrontal Cortex and the 
Amygdala in Unsuccessful Psychopaths, 119 J. ABNORM. PSYCHOL. 546 (2010). 
 205 Adrian Raine & Yaling Yang, Neural Foundations to Moral Reasoning and 
Antisocial Behavior, 1 SOC. COGN. & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCI. 203 (2006). 
 206 Id. at 205–06. 
 207 See, e.g., Jean Decety et al., Brain Response to Empathy-Eliciting Scenarios 
Involving Pain in Incarcerated Individuals with Psychopathy, 70 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 638 
(2013). 
 208 Neil Levy, The Responsibility of the Psychopath Revisited, 14 PHIL. PSYCHIATRY & 
PSYCHOL. 129, 132 (2007) (claiming that psychopaths know their actions “are widely 
perceived to be wrong . . . they are unable to grasp the distinctive nature and significance of 
their wrongness”). 
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simply meant prohibited by local authorities.209  This means that even if 
psychopaths are perfectly capable of propositionally distinguishing 
rightness from wrongness, and therefore of knowing the moral meaning of a 
given action, they tend to make socially poor or immoral decisions because 
they are unable to generate the feelings that guide adaptive decision-making 
in healthy individuals. 
All things considered, neuroscientific studies seem to confirm the 
substantial artificiality of the net distinction between “cognition” and 
“emotion” in moral judgment and decision-making.  First, emotion is not 
essentially disruptive to moral reasoning; rather, it is part of it. Second, 
knowledge or understanding of moral wrongs does not lead to moral 
behavior if it exists without emotional influence.  That is, appreciating the 
moral meaning of one’s own conduct does not simply require verbal 
knowledge of what is right and what is wrong, but also a feeling of the 
moral significance of given conduct in a given social context.210 
Changing the perspective on moral (and antisocial) decision-making 
may have significant implications for criminal law’s rationalist conception 
of the culpable agent.  If emotions and feelings are integral parts of the 
mental processes leading to moral decisions and behaviors, a truly accurate 
model of the legally relevant mind that underpins culpability-related 
doctrines such as insanity should also include the emotional dimension in 
its relevant substance.  Emotion and affect have a bearing on moral 
rationality, and the cognitive ability to know the value of an action does not 
sufficiently explain one’s capacity to behave morally in a given social 
context without also considering emotional influences.  Considering these 
insights, a rational moral agent is one who is also able to emotionally 
appreciate—rather than simply know—the moral significance of his or her 
conduct.211  When this capacity is severely impaired, the agent falls short of 
being a morally rational individual.  Ideally, he or she should be excused. 
 
 209 R.J.R. Blair, A Cognitive Developmental Approach to Morality: Investigating the 
Psychopath, 57 COGNITION 1 (1995). 
 210 See Raine & Yang, supra note 205, at 209 (“[I]t is predominantly the feeling of what 
is moral that is deficient in antisocial groups, rather than the knowing of what is moral. This 
moral feeling, centered on the PFC and amygdala, is the engine that translates the cognitive 
recognition that an act is immoral into behavioral inhibition—and it is this engine that 
functions less well in antisocial . . . individuals.”). 
 211 See Ralph Slovenko, Psychiatry, Criminal Law, and the Role of the Psychiatrist, 12 
DUKE L J. 395, 397 (“The dictum, ‘Cogito, ergo sum,’ ‘I think, therefore I am,’ is, however, 
the formula for the schizoid intellectual’s struggle to possess an ego. A healthy human being 
would be more likely to start from ‘I feel, therefore I am’.”). 
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B. SELF-CONTROL ABILITIES ALSO DEPEND ON EMOTIONS 
Neuroscientific studies also dispute the legal conception of the (lack 
of) capacity for self-control.  Neuroscientific research on self-control is 
ongoing, and a clear-cut taxonomy of self-control is lacking,212 but there is 
a consensus understanding of self-control rather as a multidimensional 
construct 213 involving a number of distinct cognitive and socio-emotional 
capacities, each of which contributes to individuals’ control abilities.214 
Regarding moral contexts, neuroscientific research suggests that 
people’s capacity to regulate and inhibit impulses also—though not 
exclusively—depends on their ability to “wilfully suspend” 215 immediate 
gratifications in favor of long-term outcomes, which is critical to pro-social, 
law-abiding behavior.216  This ability appears to depend on the reward 
 
 212 Joshua Buckholtz et al., A Neuro-Legal Lingua Franca: Bridging Law and 
Neuroscience on the Issue of Self-Control, 5 MENTAL HEALTH L. & POL’Y. J. 1, 13 (2016). 
Admittedly, behavioral and neuroscientific terminology regarding self-control manifests a 
lack of conceptual clarity. Looking at the literature, the notion of self-control is either related 
to or distinguished from other abilities including cognitive control, self-regulation, or 
emotion regulation. Each of these abilities appears to have a role in buffering impulsive 
behavior. See infra notes 214–16. In this Section, I mostly refer to what psychological and 
neuroscientific literature frequently addresses as “self-regulation,” and to its role in impulse 
and behavioral control. 
 213 Id. at 13. 
 214 See Marc Lewis & Rebecca Todd, The Self-Regulating Brain: Cortical-Subcortical 
Feedback and the Development of Intelligent Action, 22 COGN. DEV. 406 (2007); Ethan 
Kross & Kevin Ochsner, Integrating Research on Self-control Across Multiple Levels of 
Analysis: Insights from Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, in SELF CONTROL IN 
SOCIETY, MIND, AND BRAIN 76 (Ran Hassin, Kevin Ochsner, & Yacoov Trope eds., 2010); 
Sezin Öner, Neural Substrates of Cognitive Emotion Regulation: A Brief Review, 28 
PSYCHIATRY & CLIN. PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 91 (2017). 
 215 See Cole Korponay & Michael Koenigs, The Neurobiology of Antisocial and Amoral 
Behavior, in LEGAL INSANITY AND THE BRAIN 27 (Sofia Moratti & Dennis Patterson eds., 
2016). 
 216 Id. In psychological and neuroscientific literature, this ability is frequently referred to 
as “self-regulation”: see, e.g., Lambros Lazarus et al., The Roles of Impulsivity, Self-
regulation, and Emotion Regulation in the Experience of Self-disgust, 43 MOTIV. & 
EMO. 145, 147 (2019) (defining self-regulation as “people’s capacity to focus on their 
long-term goals and resist temptation and impulses for immediate gratification . . . As 
such, self-regulation involves the ability to alter thoughts, actions, and emotions in a way 
that serves goal striving, whether the goal is set by the self, the society or both.”). While 
some authors use the term self-regulation and self-control interchangeably, others 
consider self-control to be a subset of self-regulation or vice versa. See, e.g., Wilehlm 
Hoffmann et al., Executive Functions and Self-regulation, 16 TRENDS IN COGN. SCI., 174, 
174 (2012) (defining self-regulation as “goal-directed behavior” and self-control as “a 
narrower subset of self-regulatory processes [aiming] to override unwanted, prepotent 
impulses or urges . . . .”). Cfr. Buckholtz et al. supra note 212 at 15–16 (referring to the 
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system, which involves and connects the activity of both prototypical 
emotional subcortical (including the amygdala, the ventral tegmental area 
and the nucleus accumbens) and neocortical brain areas (notably the 
DLPFC, dorsal-ACC [dACC], the OFC, and the VmPFC), both of which 
serve interdependent functions of emotional processing, motivation, and 
inhibition in goal-directed behavior.217  Studies indicate that subcortical 
regions involved in the reward system, such as the amygdala, process 
perceptual stimuli (events) through the generation of appropriate emotional 
responses.218  Consequently, the prefrontal regions exert modulatory control 
on the representation of perceptual stimuli, and thus in turn modulate the 
expression and evaluation of emotions.219  Put this way, the emotional 
response to a given event (or stimulus) facilitates the exertion of cognitive 
control. In its turn, cognitive control—also referred to as executive 
functions—appears to downregulate emotional inputs. 
As emerges from this brief explanation, there is nothing in the brain 
resembling an absolute regulator and an absolute regulatee of impulses and 
behavior.  Rather, impulse and behavioral regulation are governed by a 
sufficiently powerful coordination system between subcortical and cortical 
brain structures and, thus, they largely involve cognitive and emotional 
functions.220  As Lewis and Todd suggested, cortical and subcortical 
regions stand in a reciprocal relationship during decision-making and self-
regulation in that “cortical activities regulate subcortical activities through 
executive modulation of prepotent appraisals and emotional responses; 
[while] subcortical systems regulate the cortex by tuning its activities to the 
demands or opportunities provided by the environment.”221  Therefore, 
emotional appraisal of external stimuli, and cognitive control over 
emotional responses are both critical in guaranteeing appropriate choices 
and thus behavioral outcomes. 
 
ability to delay immediate gratification in favor of long-term outcomes as a specific domain 
of self-control). 
 217 Id. 
 218 See, e.g., Elizabeth Murray, The Amygdala, Reward and Emotion, 11 TRENDS COGN. 
SCI. 489 (2007). 
 219 See, e.g., Öner, supra note 214; Liyang Sai et al., Individual Differences in the 
Habitual Use of Cognitive Reappraisal Predict the Reward-Related Processing, 6 FRONT. 
PSYCHOL. 1256 (2015); J.T. Buhle et al., Cognitive Reappraisal of Emotion: A Meta-
Analysis of Human Neuroimaging Studies, 24 CEREB. CORTEX 2981 (2014). 
 220 See Lewis & Todd, supra note 214, at 412 (“Coordination across levels of the 
neuroaxis is a powerful vehicle for self-regulation, and specifying particular structures at 
particular levels opens the door to a precise descriptive language for modeling psychological 
self-regulation using neural terms.”). 
 221 Id. at 406. 
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Importantly, the systems involved in inhibition and impulse regulation 
may be irrespective of an individual’s moral knowledge or understanding of 
his or her conduct.  As Sapolsky described it, “it is possible for a person to 
retain the cognitive capacity to distinguish right from wrong behaviour and, 
nonetheless, for reasons of mental illness, to be organically incapable of 
regulating the appropriateness of their behaviour.”222  Confirming this 
account, lesion studies have suggested that people with abnormalities in the 
functioning of the emotion-related brain regions involved in the reward 
system—like the VmPFC—possess adequate social and moral knowledge, 
but appear to be unable to effectively apply that knowledge to action.223  
Consequently, even if they are able to state what they should do in a given 
moral situation, they choose to do something else. 
As Miller et al. observed, these findings suggest that the VmPFC 
functions as the “site of interaction” of “valuation and self-control 
processes”224 during decision-making.  Such interaction seems “to facilitate 
successful self-control.”225  Importantly, these results fit into the larger 
body of data indicating the important role of the VmPFC in mediating and 
integrating cognitive and emotional influences on decision-making and 
behavior.226  Antonio Damasio’s famous work on his young patient, to 
whom he referred as Elliot, supports the latter claim.  Elliot had undergone 
a radical personality change after a surgery to remove a brain tumor on the 
surface of his frontal lobes.227  Elliot’s intelligence had remained 
substantially intact after the operation.228 
 
 222 Robert Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, 359 PHIL. 
TRANS. R. SOC’Y. LOND. B. 1787, 1790 (2004). 
 223 See, e.g., Young et al., supra note 180; Rupa Gupta et al., The Amygdala and 
Decision-Making, 49 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 760 (2011). 
 224 Erica Miller et al., Delay Discounting: A Two-Systems Perspective, HANDBOOK OF 
EMOTION REGULATION 93, 102 (James Gross ed., 2d ed 2014). 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. 
 227 DAMASIO, supra note 154, at 36 (“The surgery was a success in every respect, and 
insofar as such tumors tend not to grow again, the outlook was excellent. What was to prove 
less felicitous was the turn in Elliot’s personality. The changes, which began during his 
physical recovery, astonished family and friends. . . . In many ways . . . Elliot was no longer 
Elliot.”). 
 228 Id. (“To be sure, Elliot’s smarts and his ability to move about and use language were 
unscathed . . . . His knowledge base seemed to survive, and he could perform many separate 
actions as well as before.”). 
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However, Elliot became disinhibited, undisciplined, and unemotive.229  
In post-surgery tests, as Damasio wrote, “Elliot emerged as a man with a 
normal intellect who was unable to decide properly, especially when the 
decision involved personal and social matters.”230  Damasio gave Elliot a 
test that showed one additional post-operation change: Elliot’s VmPFC 
damage had compromised his ability to feel and process emotion, and thus 
to make personal and socially appropriate decisions.231  “[T]he cold-
bloodedness of Elliot’s reasoning,” writes Damasio, “prevented him from 
assigning different values to different options, and made his decision-
making landscape hopelessly flat.”232 
In a famous series of lesion studies using the Iowa gambling task 
(IGT),233 Bechara et al. examined the decision-making of patients with 
damage to the VmPFC.234  This set of studies suggested that VmPFC-
damaged patients tend to be insensitive to future consequences of their 
choices, and are primarily guided by immediate gains.235  As Jeremy Gray 
observed, these findings suggest that patients with VmPFC damage “lack 
mechanisms of emotion-related feedback that healthy participants use to 
adaptively bias their choices in the IGT.”236  Therefore, VmPFC patients’ 
decision-making abilities are impaired likely due to “their lack of an 
appropriate affective basis on which to make adaptive choices.”237 
 
 229 Id. at 38 (“The tragedy of this otherwise healthy and intelligent man was that he was 
neither stupid nor ignorant, and yet he acted often as if he were. The machinery for his 
decision making was so flawed that he could no longer be an effective social being.”). 
 230 Id. at 43. 
 231 See id. at 38–51. 
 232 Id. at 51. See also Miller et al., supra note 224, at 102 (“Elliot’s problem lay in 
linking automatic valuation and regulatory control when necessary to make a decision.”). 
 233 Antoine Bechara et al., Insensitivity to Future Consequences Following Damage to 
Human Prefrontal Cortex, 50 COGNITION 7 (1994). The IGT is a psychological task designed 
to stimulate real-life decision making. Participants are required to choose between decks of 
cards that yield high immediate gain but larger future loss, i.e., a long-term loss, and decks 
that yield lower immediate gain but a smaller future loss, i.e., a long-term gain. 
 234 Id.; see also Antoine Bechara et al., Characterization of the Decision-Making of 
Patients with Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Lesions, 123 BRAIN 2189 (2000). 
 235 See id. at 2198 (“VM lesion patients preferred decks with high immediate reward to 
those with smaller reward, although the decks with small reward were more advantageous in 
the long term. VM lesion patients also preferred decks that had low immediate punishment 
to those with higher immediate punishment, although the decks with higher immediate 
punishment were more advantageous in the long run.”). 
 236 Jeremy Gray, Affect and Action Control, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF HUMAN ACTION 
277, 283 (Ezequiel Morsella, John Bargh & Peter Gollwitzer eds., 2009). 
 237 Id. 
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In another study, Bechara et al. compared the different roles of 
VmPFC and amygdala damages in volitional processes.238  They concluded 
that amygdala damages can hinder or strongly reduce one’s ability to 
discern the emotional attributes of an emotionally charged stimulus.239  As a 
consequence, amygdala-damaged patients are unable to sufficiently 
“experience the emotional attributes of a stimulus that is charged with 
emotion.”240  Similarly, a study by Hampton et al. indicated that patients 
with amygdala damage exhibited a profound change in PFC activity related 
to reward expectation and behavioral choice, indicating that information 
related to behavioral choice in PFC relies directly on input from the 
amygdala.241  Altogether, these studies have indicated that abnormal 
functioning in the amygdala may well have a significant negative impact on 
emotional information processing at a cognitive level, resulting in poor 
control over behavioral responses.242 
Additional support for this perspective emerges from studies on 
neuropsychiatric antisocial populations.  These studies found links between 
deficits in socio-emotional brain circuits and inhibition.243  They suggested 
that those who show a lack of insight into their own behavior as well as a 
lack of moral emotions and emotional responses towards others (e.g., 
empathy)244 are less inhibited in violating the rights of others.  For instance, 
injury to the VmPFC and the ACC—which, once again, are critical in 
emotional processing, as well as in behavioral motivation and regulation—
have been linked to the onset of reckless and antisocial behavior without 
 
 238 Antoine Bechara et al., Different Contributions of the Human Amygdala and Ventromedial 
Prefrontal Cortex to Decision-Making, 19 J. NEUROSCI. 5473 (1999). 
 239 Id. at 5479 (“We see the impairment in decision-making after amygdala damage as 
an indirect consequence of the role of the amygdala in attaching affective attributes to 
stimuli.”). 
 240 Id. at 5473. 
 241 Alan N. Hampton et al., Contributions of the Amygdala to Reward Expectancy and 
Choice Signals in Human Prefrontal Cortex, 55 NEURON 545 (2007). 
 242 See Steven Penney, Impulse Control and Criminal Responsibility: Lessons from 
Neuroscience, 35 INT’L J.L. PSYCHIATRY 99, 100 (2012). 
 243 See also Birgit Völlm, Neurobiological Substrates of Antisocial and Borderline 
Personality Disorder: Preliminary Results of a Functional fMRI Study, 14 CRIM. BEHAV. 
MENTAL HEALTH 39 (2004); Lau Siew Tee & Norshia Fauzan, The Role of the Anterior 
Cingulate Cortex and Amygdala on Criminal Behavior, 2 J. SCI. RES. & BEHAV. 203 (2015); 
Cole Korponay et al., Impulsive-Antisocial Dimension of Psychopathy Linked to 
Enlargement and Abnormal Functional Connectivity of the Striatum, 2 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 
149 (2017). 
 244 See also James Blair & Karina Blair, Empathy, Morality, and Social Convention: 
Evidence from the Study of Psychopathy and Other Psychiatric Disorders, in THE SOCIAL 
NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY, Ch. 11 (2009); Richard Davidson et al., Dysfunction in the 
Neural Circuit of Emotion Regulation, 289 SCIENCE 591 (2000). 
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remorse.245  Importantly, as one study has highlighted, “[w]ithout the 
restraint of intuitive moral emotions and self-other conjoining . . . patients 
may not be able to deter an impulse to act in an unacceptable manner, even 
as they know right and wrong and understand the nature of their acts.”246 
All things considered, neuroscience research impugns the legal 
understanding of self-control in two main respects.  First, self-control is not 
a unitary capacity247 that either exists or does not exist. Rather, a multitude 
of complex and, sometimes, interrelated processes are involved self-control 
abilities.  These processes involve brain mechanisms that are not purely or 
solely cognitive, but form complex circuits in which affective and 
motivational processes also play a prominent role in the evaluation, 
information processing, regulation, and appropriate reaction to salient 
stimuli.  Thus, as has been observed, because abilities of self-control appear 
to depend on a multitude of dissociable processes, preserved functioning in 
one of these processes may still be accompanied by poor functioning in 
others.248  Although this does not imply a total lack of the capacity for self-
control, this capacity may still be compromised. 
Second, and consequently, people’s volitional power to choose which 
conduct to engage in within a given context, and thus to regulate their 
impulses, is not a logical consequence of their cognitive faculties of 
knowledge and understanding.  The neuroscientific studies reported above 
suggest that the mechanisms involved in self-control support both cognitive 
and emotional processes, which serve distinct—yet related—functions in 
governing volitional faculties.  A disruption in either cognitive or emotional 
processes (e.g., maladaptive emotional responses or deficient cognitive 
regulation) can equally endanger a given choice of appropriate behavior in 
response to a certain stimulus.  Therefore, the factual or moral knowledge, 
or understanding, of the meaning of a certain action does not necessarily 
imply that antisocial impulses are controlled or that morally appropriate 
choices are made.  As Jeffrey Rosen has asserted, “you can have a 
horrendously damaged brain where someone knows the difference between 
right and wrong but nonetheless can’t control their behavior.  At that point, 
 
 245 See, e.g., Michael Koenigs, The Role of Prefrontal Cortex in Psychopathy, 23 REV. 
NEUROSCI. 253 (2012); Julian Motzkin et al., Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex is Critical for 
the Regulation of Amygdala Activity in Humans, 77 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 276 (2015). 
 246 Mendez, supra note 184, at 611. 
 247 See Buckholtz et al., supra note 212, at 13. 
 248 Id. 
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you’re dealing with a broken machine, and concepts like punishment and 
evil and sin become utterly irrelevant.”249 
 In sum, a rational moral agent appears to be one who retains 
sufficient capacities for choosing appropriate moral conduct, regardless of 
whether or not he or she is able to verbally determine whether that conduct 
is either right or wrong.  Accordingly, not only should “self-control” and 
“knowledge” be evaluated and assessed separately, but the role that 
emotional faculties play in affecting self-control abilities should also be 
reconsidered. 
IV. A TRIPARTITE TEST FOR LEGAL INSANITY 
Neuroscientific insights into emotions and moral decision-making 
highlight that criminal law’s ascriptions of the capacity for moral rationality 
to an alleged overriding cognitive sphere is limited and incomplete.  As 
noted above, moral behavior is an integrated core of intertwined functions 
(i.e., cognitive and emotional) which only together may properly contribute 
to an individual’s practical reasoning in accordance with the 
moral/normative requirements.250  It is flawed and unrealistic to maintain 
the view that higher cognition is the sole—or even the principal—
controlling function of morally rational decision-making and behavior.  
Emotions and emotional processes significantly contribute to the mental 
equilibrium that allows individuals to behave in accordance with social, 
moral, and legal rules. 
 
 249 Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 11, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/11/magazine/11Neurolaw.t.html?pagewanted=al 
[https://perma.cc/NQ8V-MNKG]. 
 250 See Patricia Greenspan, Practical Reasoning and Emotion, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF RATIONALITY 206 (Alfred Mele & Piers Rawling eds., 2004) (arguing that the 
neuroscientific insights into emotions suggest that practical reasoning relies upon 
normal emotional development and functioning). Considering their guidance role, 
Greenspan holds that emotions are factors in our practical reasoning for two main reasons. 
First, emotions reinforce nonemotional reasons—e.g., desires, beliefs. By evaluating brute 
facts or stimuli through the attachment of positive or negative valences, emotions yield 
further non-emotional reasons “to sustain the conditions that make the evaluation 
appropriate.” Id. This implies an understanding of emotions in normative terms, as providing 
or expressing reasons for actions. For instance, feeling moral guilt at the prospect of doing a 
given act can involve a negative moral judgment that the act is morally wrong along with an 
aversion to that act. This feeling of guilt might be an input to our desires and beliefs, and 
thus to our overall moral reasoning up to our behavioral outcome. Second, emotion provides 
evaluative propositions—e.g., that something might cause harm— and thus anticipate 
practical eventualities of actions or situations, thereby making an individual react 
accordingly. Therefore, when an actor chooses to do something for a reason, he does so on 
the basis of some sort of pro attitude toward actions of a certain kind, that is, some emotional 
commitment to it, whatever it is. 
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A reexamination of the role of emotions within the capacity for moral 
rationality entails an expansion of the relevant mental substance underlying 
the legal notion of insanity and produces two significant consequences for 
insanity tests.  The first concerns the recognition of severe emotional 
deficits as eligible conditions for the insanity defense.  The second concerns 
a different conception of volitional capacity as a multi-faceted construct 
involving a variety of functions (both cognitive and emotional): functions 
that are not necessarily related to the cognitive faculties of knowledge and 
understanding. 
Altogether, such a reexamination would lead insanity tests to become 
tripartite and more dimensional, i.e., inclusive of cognitive, emotional, and 
volitional prongs.  The cognitive prong would equate to an intellectual 
capacity test—that is, a test measuring the defendant’s knowledge or 
understanding of the factual and moral meaning of his or her conduct.  The 
emotional prong would equate to an emotional capacity test—that is, a test 
measuring the defendant’s capacity to emotionally appreciate the moral 
significance of his or her conduct.  The volitional prong would equate to a 
control test—that is, a test measuring the defendant’s capacity to control his 
or her impulses.  Importantly, the volitional prong would be reconsidered to 
include emotion within its relevant application.  Also, the volitional prong 
would be autonomous from the cognitive prong. 
Expanding the substance of the volitional prong to incorporate 
emotional components also has consequences for the diminished capacity 
doctrine, as it is regulated by both the common law “heat of passion” and 
the MPC’s EED standards.  In fact, rethinking the relationship between 
volition and emotion within insanity standards—that is, accepting that 
volitional impairments also meet insanity criteria when they are due to 
severe emotional dysfunctions—implies placing insanity and diminished 
capacity on a continuum, as the requirements to meet insanity and 
diminished-capacity standards would be the same.  Therefore, the 
difference between insanity and diminished capacity proves to be purely 
quantitative, and diminished capacity is transformed into a “generic partial 
excuse” (or, perhaps more correctly, “generic partial insanity”), thereby 
integrating and supporting the validity of Professor Stephen Morse’s 
argument for introducing such a doctrine in Anglo-American criminal law. 
A. LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THE COGNITIVE PRONG 
As discussed, criminal law attributes the mental substance of insanity 
exclusively to cognition.  Traditionally, the cognitive dimension is 
responsible both for agents’ cognitive faculties of understanding and 
knowing the factual and moral meaning of their conduct, and for their 
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volitional faculties of self-control as a consequence.  Enriching the 
substance of the capacity for moral rationality with the contribution of 
emotion clearly implies the limitation of attributing such an absolute role to 
cognition within insanity tests. 
Very simply, cognition remains the mental dimension that governs the 
evaluation in the cognitive prong of the insanity test: it remains responsible 
for the evaluation of one’s capacity to propositionally understand the 
factual and moral meaning of his or her actions.  The “factual knowledge” 
test remains one that measures whether an agent possessed a sufficient 
degree of cognitive or intellectual functioning to retain a factual 
understanding and knowledge of his or her action in a given context.  For 
example, as some authors have suggested, the evaluation of this specific 
mental prong would encompass an agent’s IQ level.251  Regarding the 
“moral knowledge” test, because cognitive mechanisms are surely 
responsible for enabling agents’ verbal understanding and knowledge of the 
moral significance of their actions (i.e., telling right from wrong), the new 
model of legal insanity retains the role of cognitive intelligence as mental 
source of agents’ understanding and knowledge of the moral significance of 
their actions. 
The difference with respect to the traditional model of legal insanity is 
that cognition is no longer treated as the sole mental faculty in charge of 
volitional faculties.  This difference, of course, does not mean to deny that 
cognitive faculties contribute to one’s capacity for self-control. As 
previously discussed, volitional processes involve their own mechanisms, 
both cognitive and emotional.252  However, these mechanisms stand on 
their own; that is, they are not necessarily related to one’s cognitive 
understanding and knowledge of the factual or moral significance of a 
given behavior, or its consequences.  Thus, the “separation” of volition 
from cognition is simply intended to eliminate the “dependence” of the 
control test on the knowledge test, and thus to support a view of the 
volitional prong as an autonomous test. 
B. INCLUDING AN EMOTIONAL PRONG 
The empirical sciences reveal that people appreciate the social and 
moral significance of their acts, not only of their cognitive awareness that 
an act is wrong, but also of their experience of the usual moral feelings 
associated with that act.253  Critically, neuroscientific (and psychological) 
 
 251 See supra note 215, at 31. 
 252 See supra Part III.C. 
 253 See supra Part III.A. 
52 COPPOLA [Vol. 109 
studies indicate that possessing verbal or instrumental knowledge of 
something is not synonymous with being capable of moral decision-making 
and behavior if the relevant emotions are lacking.254  On the contrary, the 
existence of the former in the absence of the latter is a potential description 
of abnormal or even pathological conditions.255  Thus, emotional 
appreciation, in addition to intellectual awareness, should more correctly be 
viewed as an integral component of the capacities for moral rationality that 
form the mental preconditions of culpability and responsibility.256 
Giving prominence to the emotional sphere within the capacity for 
moral rationality implies that an emotional prong would be explicitly 
included within an insanity ruling.  The emotional prong of insanity tests 
would assess agents’ capacity to emotionally appreciate the moral 
significance of their actions.  Consequently, agents are potentially not 
culpable as long as they display such a disrupted emotional system that they 
are unable to perceive the rightness or wrongness of their actions, 
regardless of their verbal understanding or knowledge of the factual or 
moral facets of those actions.  The emotional prong would thus measure 
whether the defendant in question possessed sufficient emotional capacities 
typically involved in moral judgments and behavior—for example, the 
capacity to feel empathic concern—in order to evaluate whether he or she 
was able to also perceive, or appreciate, the moral significance of the 
criminal act he or she committed. 
To make these claims more solid, what follows examines which 
tangible effects the acceptance of emotional capacity as part of insanity 
tests could have on current insanity standards.  Turning first to M’Naghten, 
the intellectual test it contains requires that a “defect of reason” arising 
from a “disease of [the] mind,” must impair the defendant’s ability to 
“know” the nature and quality of the act he or she was committing, as well 
as his or her capacity to know that the act was wrong.257  The inclusion of 
an emotional prong in the formulation and the substance of the M’Naghten 
rule would therefore have an impact on three different levels: first, the 
meaning of “reason”; second, the meaning of “disease of [the] mind”; and 
third, the meaning of “know.” 
Let us begin with “reason.”  According to traditional legal 
understandings, the concept of “reason”—as capacity for moral 
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 256 See ST. JOHN’S L. REV., supra note 33, at 250 (“While an individual may understand 
both the nature of his act and its wrongfulness [cognition], he may nevertheless, due to 
mental illness . . . be so emotionally deranged [affection] as to be irresponsible.”). 
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rationality—encompasses only cognitive faculties.  The discussion above, 
however, has suggested that the capacity for moral judgment and behavior 
also requires and depends on the normal functioning of emotional faculties, 
enabling an individual to also feel the moral significance of his or her 
actions.  Thus, the defect-of-reason clause is no longer to be understood as 
an intellect-based defect of moral rationality but encompasses a broader 
notion of the capacity for moral rationality: one that also embraces 
emotional faculties. 
If the scope of the word “reason” expands to also include emotional 
components, it follows that the concept of the sort of “disease of [the] 
mind” that can cause such a defect of reason must change and be expanded 
accordingly.  That is, the disease-of-the-mind clause would also encompass 
severe emotional abnormalities as eligible conditions that may lead to a 
disruption of the capacity for moral rationality. 
What is more, a broadening of both notions (“defect of reason” and 
“disease of [the] mind”) would inevitably lead to an expansion of the scope 
of the word “know” in a way that gives more weight to emotional 
components.  However, to avoid conceptual and interpretive confusion, a 
more precise formulation of the test could maintain the knowledge 
requirement as an indicator in the cognitive test, but add an explicit 
provision for an emotional prong, which would require proof of the 
person’s lack of emotional appreciation of the moral significance of his or 
her criminal act. 
Consequently, a potential reformulation of the M’Naghten test that 
considers the emotional prong reads as follows: 
To establish a defense on the grounds of insanity, it must be clearly proven that, at 
the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect 
of moral rationality, from impairment of the party’s cognitive or emotional 
capacities, or both, of such extent as to lack the capacity to know the nature and 
quality of the act he or she was doing or to appreciate emotionally that the act was 
legally and morally wrong. 
Regarding the ALI test, the current formulation seems to be more 
consistent with an emotionally informed understanding of the relevant 
capacities for moral rationality.  In fact, the verb “to appreciate” seems to 
also contain an emotional test.  As noted above, however, this term has 
caused much controversy because it is unclear how broadly it should be 
understood.258 
Regardless of whether the verb “to appreciate” would be better 
interpreted more narrowly (as solely cognitive) or more broadly (as 
encompassing emotion), it can generate confusion.  In fact, by attributing to 
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the word “appreciate” both cognitive and emotional meaning, the line 
between these two forms of meaning could become excessively blurred.  
Ultimately, the risk would remain that relevance continues to be attributed 
solely to cognitive defects, without dedicating significant consideration to 
the emotional defects.  Moreover, if one accepts that emotional (in)capacity 
plays a definite and autonomous role in moral judgments, it would appear 
to be more correct to split the word “appreciate” into two different 
requirements, such as knowing and emotionally appreciating the criminality 
of one’s conduct. 
The provision of Section 4.01(1) would therefore read as follows: 
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of 
such conduct, as a result of a mental disease or disorder, causing 
impairment of his or her cognitive or emotional capacities, or both, 
he or she lacked substantial capacity either to understand the 
factual and moral meaning of his or her conduct, or to appreciate 
emotionally the moral significance of his or her conduct . . . . 
Admittedly, introducing an explicit emotional prong in the first 
paragraph of the ALI test poses some challenges for the caveat paragraph 
contained in Section 4.01(2).  Specifically, if emotional capacity becomes a 
prong of the insanity test, then the rationale of the caveat paragraph 
seemingly becomes meaningless.  Admittedly, the categories of people to 
which the paragraph actually refers, namely psychopaths and more broadly 
people suffering from disorders that are characterized by severe socio-
affective deficits, would become eligible for an insanity plea by virtue of 
the test’s newly introduced emotional prong. 
The caveat paragraph, however, should not be eliminated and should 
continue serving its deterrent function, although to a different extent.  Not 
all “repeated manifestations of criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct” are 
symptomatic of pathological emotional deficits,259 nor do emotional deficits 
necessarily lead to antisocial behavior.  For emotional deficits to potentially 
exculpate defendants, it must be convincingly proven that they are 
sufficiently severely pathological to have a seriously compromised capacity 
for moral judgment at the time of the crime.  Of course, it would be up to 
juries—with the help of expert witnesses—to evaluate and assess, case by 
case, the pathological seriousness of emotional derangements within the 
domain of insanity pleas.  This sort of assessment is not new compared to 
what has been done to date with traditional tests. 
 
 259 Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 72–73 (9th Cir. 1970) (correctly pointing out 
that “[i]t is practically inconceivable that mental disease or defect would . . . be manifested 
only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct”). 
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C. INTEGRATING EMOTIONS IN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE VOLITIONAL 
PRONG 
The third feature of the new model of insanity concerns making the 
volitional prong (i.e., the capacity to choose which type of conduct to 
engage in and therefore to exert self-control) independent of the cognitive 
one.  As observed above, the volitional prong in insanity tests plays a 
secondary role in comparison to the cognitive prong. Indeed, some insanity 
standards (e.g., the M’Naghten test) do not include an explicit control test at 
all, thereby placing the burden of insanity entirely on the cognitive 
knowledge test.  Other tests, however, do require that agents are capable of 
controlling their impulses at the time of the crime and therefore also of 
conforming their behavior to what the law prescribes (according to the 
MPC model).260  However, even in this case, the autonomy of the volitional 
prong proves to be mostly theoretical and poorly applied. 
As previously discussed, neither of these two conceptions of volitional 
incapacity explicitly consider the emotional dimension.  The reason, as set 
out above, is that emotions are not considered to be part of what comprises 
the capacity for moral rationality.  Therefore, even when emotions are 
impaired and provoke a lack of self-control, the law does not understand 
this condition to entail a lack of moral rationality that could serve as 
grounds for an excuse.261  Ergo, when the lack of self-control depends on a 
cognitive defect—that is, when a person is not able to control his or her 
impulses and to conform his or her behavior due to an altered perception of 
reality—this condition constitutes reasonable grounds for an insanity 
defense.262  However, when the lack of self-control is due to an emotional 
defect—i.e., when a person is not able to control his or her impulses 
because of an extreme (pathological) emotional disturbance—this condition 
is not considered to form acceptable grounds for an insanity defense.263  
Rather, a lack of self-control due to emotional impairments alone at best 
constitutes a mitigating factor, one that could lead to the recognition of a 
lesser degree of culpability in terms of the degree of crime, as in the EED 
defense provided by the MPC. 
As discussed above, self-control appears to rely upon a variety of 
distinct cognitive and socio-emotional processes, each of which contributes 
to individuals’ control abilities.264  Importantly, preserved functioning in 
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one of these processes may still be accompanied by poor functioning in 
others.265  Furthermore, the processes involved in self-control may be 
irrespective of an individual’s moral knowledge or understanding of his or 
her conduct.  Thus, even if an individual is able to know right from wrong, 
he or she may still be unable—due to a disruption affecting self-control 
mechanisms (either cognitive or emotional)—to apply that knowledge to 
action. 
If insanity standards were based on a definition that accepted this 
broader and multi-faceted vision of volitional capacity, then an incapacity 
for self-control would be allotted the same amount of relevance regardless 
of whether it is the result of severe emotional or cognitive defects.  Thus, 
the substance of volitional incapacity could be reconceptualized as an 
incapacity to choose which conduct to engage in, resulting from deficits in 
either cognitive or emotional processes involved in self-control abilities.  
Importantly, this evaluation would be autonomous and irrespective of the 
cognitive faculties of knowledge and understanding. 
The reconceptualization of the volitional prong as an autonomous 
prong would have diverse implications for different insanity standards. Let 
us begin with the M’Naghten rule.  As previously discussed, the traditional 
formulation of this test does not encompass a volitional component.  The 
reason, as elaborated above, lies in the fact that the test presumes cognition 
to be the only relevant mental dimension responsible for moral behavior, as 
it produces the knowledge of the nature and quality of an act, as well as of 
whether the act violates society’s morals.  If one is in possession of this 
knowledge, then he or she is presumed to be able to control any impulses. 
Accepting that volitional processes have their own cognitive and 
emotional mechanisms, which are irrespective of one’s cognitive faculties 
of knowledge and understanding, implies that the narrow cognitive test 
contained in the M’Naghten rule would be expanded to also include a 
volitional capacity test.  A potential re-formulation of the test with the 
introduction of a volitional prong, in addition to a cognitive and an 
emotional one, reads as follows: 
To establish a defense on the grounds of insanity, it must be clearly 
proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was 
laboring under a defect of moral rationality, from impairment of the party’s 
cognitive and/or emotional capacities, or both, of such extent as to lack the 
capacity to know the nature and quality of his or her act, to appreciate 
emotionally that the act was wrong, or to conform his or her behavior to his 
or her knowledge or appreciation. 
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The same mechanism can be applied to the ALI test. Reconsidering 
the control test contained in Section 4.01(1) of the MPC from the 
perspective of an understanding of volitional capacity that also depends on 
emotional factors, this provision can be reformulated as follows: 
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of 
such conduct as a result of a mental disease or disorder, causing 
impairment of his or her cognitive or emotional capacities, or both, 
he or she lacked substantial capacity . . . to control his or her 
conduct in the circumstances and thus to conform his or her 
conduct to the requirements of the law. 
As this reformulation makes clear, the introduction of an emotion-
oriented notion of volitional (in)capacity would have no substantial impact 
on the ALI test, in the sense that it would simply specify the substance of 
the control test without significantly altering the test’s original formulation.  
The new formulation proposed here would simply make the test more 
specific, so as to overcome the conceptual imprecisions that the current text 
contains and to ensure there less space for interpretive uncertainty. 
D. RETHINKING DIMINISHED CAPACITY AS GENERIC PARTIAL 
INSANITY 
In addition to affecting the insanity doctrine, an emotion-oriented 
paradigm of the capacity for moral rationality may have significant 
repercussions for the diminished-capacity doctrine—such as the common 
law’s “heat of passion,” the provocation or passion doctrine, or EED 
doctrine adopted by the MPC and several single statutes in the US. 
Let us briefly recapitulate on both the provocation or passion and the 
EED doctrines.266  Both doctrines are substantially characterized by a lack 
of control due to an emotional breakdown at the time of the crime, whereby 
the former is due to a provocation, and the latter is due to an EED for which 
there is a reasonable explanation or excuse, regardless of whether there was 
any previous provocation.  The rationale underlying both doctrines is that a 
temporary lapse of control due to an intense emotional breakdown reduces, 
albeit temporarily, an individual’s rationality at the time of the crime.267  
Even so, the law does not treat this type of lack of self-control as an actual 
moral rationality defect. In fact, the scope of such mitigations is to lessen 
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only the degree of the crime, not the perpetrator’s overall culpability.268  
Also (and herein lies another paradox), both doctrines are limited to 
reducing murder to manslaughter, and neither can be applied to crimes in 
general. 
The contradictory nature of the diminished-capacity doctrine has given 
rise to several critiques.  One compelling argument against the current state 
of the diminished-capacity doctrine has been offered by Stephen Morse,269 
who vigorously affirms that diminished capacity should take on broader 
connotations.  Morse acknowledges that, contrary to the “all-or-nothing 
doctrines” adopted by current criminal law, capacities for moral rationality, 
including self-control, are continuum concepts.270  In view of the fact that 
people “display an enormously wide range of rational and control 
capacities,”271 a truly fair judgment of culpability and responsibility, as well 
as a fair determination of punishment, must consider the kinds of 
impairments that affect one’s rationality to some significant degree, even if 
they do not entirely compromise it.272  Furthermore, Morse rightly indicates 
that limiting the diminished-capacity doctrine to homicide alone is 
pointless, considering that any crime can be committed by a defendant 
whose rational capacities are to some degree impaired.273  The applicability 
of the mitigating factors in the present EED and heat of passion defenses 
should be extended to cover all crimes.  With this in mind, Morse proposes 
the adoption of an additional verdict, namely the “Guilty but Partially 
Responsible” verdict, as a new general affirmative defense that “requires a 
substantial diminution in rationality because less serious impairments are 
sufficient to warrant lesser blame and punishment.”274 
Morse’s argument remains intentionally vague about the kinds of 
mental impairments that may meet the requirements of the generic partial 
excuse he proposes.275  He argues that the generic partial responsibility 
excuse should apply in cases of less severe rationality defects, which 
implies cognitive and—irrespective of whether they are clearly provided for 
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in the text—self-control defects.276  These are basically the same kinds of 
defects (though in a lesser degree) that warrant a designation of insanity. 
Morse also argues that the partial generic excuse he proposes would 
have the effect of extending the applicability of the heat of passion and 
EED doctrines to all crimes, thereby implying that loss of self-control 
arising from emotional disturbance should also be considered a rationality 
defect.277  In so arguing, Morse seems to implicitly attribute relevance to 
the emotional factor in matters of self-control and, more broadly, 
rationality. 
If this interpretation is correct, then Morse’s theory of diminished 
capacity lends support to the emotion-oriented descriptions of moral 
rationality and insanity proposed here.  In fact, building on an emotion-
enriched view of the capacity for moral rationality, and consequently of 
self-control, the net distinction between the kinds of mental impairments 
necessary to warrant insanity and those needed to warrant diminished 
capacity prove meaningless.  Once one recognizes that emotions also play a 
role in the capacity for moral rationality, including self-control, there is no 
reason to maintain a doctrinal distinction between volitional impairments 
due to cognitive defects and volitional impairments due to emotional 
defects.  Rather, by making emotions an integral part of the capacity for 
moral rationality that grounds the insanity defense, it follows that the kinds 
of requirements that ground both doctrines are exactly the same, though to 
different degrees.  That is, diminished capacity would become a concept in 
continuum with insanity. 
Furthermore, as Morse correctly points out, a generic partial excuse 
should apply in all cases of partial rationality defects.  In combining this 
application of the generic partial excuse with the updated notion of the 
capacity for moral rationality, also including an emotional prong, it follows 
that a generic partial excuse would not apply only in cases in which a 
defendant’s mental conditions impair to some degree his or her cognitive 
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and volitional faculties, but also when these conditions compromise his or 
her emotional capacities.  This means that the mental diseases or disorders 
that could lead to a total insanity verdict could also lead to a generic partial 
excuse or—perhaps more correctly—a partial insanity verdict, depending 
on their intensity and the degree to which the defendant’s cognitive, 
emotional, and volitional capacities are compromised.  Thus, the substance 
of the generic partial insanity tests would be tailored to that of “total” 
insanity tests, with any difference between these two doctrines being 
merely quantitative, not qualitative.  Importantly, turning the diminished-
capacity doctrine (as it currently stands) into a partial-insanity doctrine 
further confirms the pointlessness of limiting the application of the 
diminished-capacity doctrine to homicide. 
On a final note, the provision for a partial insanity doctrine raises two 
sets of normative issues. First, the law should determine what degree of 
impairment is needed to fall within either of the two forms of insanity.  
Second, the law should determine what kind of sentence could follow a 
partial insanity verdict.  These issues, though critical, go beyond the scope 
of this article.  Further research is needed to explore them in more detail 
and to set a hypothetical normative framework that regulates the 
implementation of this newly introduced partial excuse. 
V. NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING AN EMOTION-ORIENTED MODEL 
OF LEGAL INSANITY 
The model of legal insanity proposed here is vulnerable to criticism. 
Admittedly, “[u]neasiness about science’s interference with legal 
understandings of cognition and responsibility, along with law’s outmoded 
view of mental illness, work concurrently to frustrate the progress of [the 
insanity] defense based on neurobiological evidence,” as one author 
wrote.278  Also, attempts to root the substance of the insanity defense in 
more scientific grounds are not new to psychiatry or legal scholarship.  
(Neuro)psychiatry and the (neuro)behavioral sciences in general have 
adopted and suggested a far-reaching understanding of mental disease, one 
that also encompasses affective and volitional disorders.279  
 
 278 Jozsef Meszaos, Achieving the Peace of Mind: The Benefits of Neurobiological 
Evidence for Battered Women Defendants, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMIN. 117, 172 (2011). 
 279 See, e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 20 (5th ed. 2013) (“A mental disorder is a syndrome 
characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotion 
regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or 
developmental processes underlying mental functioning. Mental disorders are usually 
associated with significant distress or disability in social, occupational, or other important 
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Notwithstanding, criminal law has intentionally remained mired in an 
intellectualist model of mental normalcy and therefore also of mental 
abnormality.280 
In addition to the historical reasons illustrated above, the rationale 
underlying this position is especially one of criminal justice policy.281  
Indeed, the currently dominant intellectualistic conception of insanity is 
intended to meet the retributive,282 deterrent,283 social-control, and social-
security284 needs of criminal justice.  While I comprehend the legal and 
crimino-political arguments for keeping a narrow model of legal insanity, 
these reasons are neither absolute nor insurmountable.  There are at least 
three normative counterarguments that can be offered in support of an 
expanded model of insanity that takes into account emotional components: 
1) an emotion-oriented model of legal insanity is in greater compliance with 
the principle of personal guilt; 2) an emotion-oriented model of legal 
insanity is more able to grasp the essence of blameworthiness and just 
 
activities. An expectable or culturally approved response to a common stressor or loss, such 
as the death of a loved one, is not a mental disorder.”). 
 280 See Dillard S. Gardner, Insanity as a Defense in the North Carolina Criminal Law, 
30 N.C. L. REV. 4, 7 (1951) (“For example, the notion that intelligence may be separated 
from the volitional and emotional life of an individual appears absurd and fantastic to most 
scientists, but appears to be taken for granted in legal theory.”). 
 281 Julie E. Grachek, The Insanity Defense in the Twenty-First Century: How Recent 
United States Supreme Court Case Law Can Improve the System, 81 IND. L.J. 1479, 1481–
82 (2006) (“The insanity defense addresses the policy issues inherent in the question of 
criminal culpability . . . . Society’s recognition of a moral difference between the acts of a 
sane person and a mentally ill person results in the insanity defense serving dual roles in the 
criminal justice system: 1) as a way to distinguish between offenders who are able to 
conform their conduct to the law as a result of punishment from those offenders who are not 
able to conform their conduct to the law despite punishment, and 2) as a method of ensuring 
offenders posing a threat to society are restrained.”). 
 282 Stephen J. Morse & Richard J. Bonnie, Abolishing the Insanity Defense Violates Due 
Process, 41 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 488, 489 (2013) (“In the criminal justice system, 
an offender who lacks the capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his actions as the 
result of severe mental disorder does not deserve full blame and punishment.”). 
 283 Id. (“[O]ffenders cannot be appropriately deterred because the rules of law and 
morality cannot adequately guide them.”). 
 284 Wallace A. MacBain, Insanity Defense: Conceptual Confusion and the Erosion of 
Fairness, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1983) (“[M]an possesses a free will, a capacity to 
make rational choices for which he should be held accountable . . . mentally abnormal 
offenders, determined to be nonresponsible and thus beyond the reach of criminal law, will 
be subjected to alternative rehabilitation and preventative mechanisms to assure adequate 
social control . . . one appropriate function of the insanity defense is the identification and 
exculpation of one whose capacity for free choice has been so diminished as to warrant a 
characterization of nonresponsibility with the consequent invocation of alternative social 
control mechanisms.”). 
62 COPPOLA [Vol. 109 
deserts that lie at the core of retributive punishment; and 3) an emotion-
oriented model of legal insanity strengthens the aims of rehabilitation. 
A. PERSONAL GUILT 
In “Law and Psychiatry,” Michael Moore claims that criminal law 
does and should settle for its folk psychological descriptions of human 
thought—even though they may be limited—because that is all the law 
needs to hold someone criminally responsible.285  As he writes: 
The very abstract view of persons in terms of autonomy and rationality is of course 
radically incomplete as a picture of any person we know. In particular, left out is 
the life of the emotions where, if anywhere, the ‘affection of other men’ is gained. 
Yet the radical incompleteness of the law’s view of a person is no argument that it 
is wrong. As far as it goes, the law’s view of persons could be quite correct even if 
radically incomplete.286 
Moore’s claim that the legal approach may remain true although it is 
radically incomplete exposes itself to criticism.  This is because the 
incompleteness of the practical reasoning and decision-making conditions 
underlying the traditional conception of culpability and culpability 
doctrines is precisely a means of evading the truth regarding how 
individuals reason and make decisions in moral contexts, such as decisions 
concerned with offending. 
Moving from this claim, the first argument for rethinking insanity with 
the aid of neuroscience draws on the normative consideration that criminal 
law’s reduction of blameworthiness to the dimension of cognition contrasts 
with the universal principle of personal guilt.  Here, the word “personal” 
does not denote only that culpability can be attributed only to the actual 
perpetrator of a given criminal wrongdoing.  Rather, it also indicates that 
culpability needs to be based on an individual’s actual mental and moral 
participation in the commission of an offence, that is, he or she internally 
approves of the act and decides to act in breach of legally protected values.  
Slightly differently formulated, a criminal act must belong to the mental 
and moral domain of the perpetrator, and must express his or her disregard, 
or lack of concern, for the interests of other individuals protected by the 
law.  Ultimately, this is what makes a given unlawful behavior 
blameworthy. 
To comply with the principle of personal guilt, the notion of 
culpability must embrace all relevant mental factors that contribute to an 
individual’s moral decision to act unlawfully.  In this respect, I agree fully 
with Kimberly Ferzan’s proposal for a “holistic” understanding of 
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culpability, according to which culpability is understood as the sum of 
practical reasoning and decision-making conditions underlying any 
blameworthy state of mind.287  As Ferzan asserts, “[it is precisely] the sum 
of these parts that gives rise to our normative judgment about whether the 
actor’s reasoning gave due regard to the interests of others [i.e., whether it 
is blameworthy or not].”288  While Ferzan’s holistic account of culpability 
is very accurate in grasping the essence of the notion of personal guilt, it 
should be noted that the descriptive, cognition-based model of culpability 
(and of culpability-related doctrines, such as insanity), is not sufficient to 
effectively depict an individual’s attitude of disregard for legally protected 
values—that is, his or her blameworthiness. 
In view of the illustrated (neuro)scientific teachings about moral 
judgments and antisocial behavior, it is clear that the decision to engage in 
moral types of behaviors—such as criminal behavior289—involves a far 
more complex mechanism in which emotional factors, and not only the 
cognitive ones, play a critical role.  Therefore, the blameworthy essence of 
one’s decision to act against legally protected values cannot only be found 
in neutral cognitive states, but also and more extensively in the affective 
mechanisms that underlie and drive an individual’s judgment to opt for 
immoral, rather than moral conduct. 
If culpability is viewed as the sum of the agent’s practical reasoning 
and decision-making conditions leading up to criminal actions, and since 
emotions are factors in the practical reasoning and decision-making 
conditions leading up to such actions, it follows that a notion of culpability 
that truly complies with the principle of personal guilt should also require 
that individuals possess sufficient emotional soundness at the time of the 
offence. 
B. CULPABILITY-BASED RETRIBUTION 
Retribution essentially punishes perpetrators for two reasons: the first, 
which is objective, is that the perpetrators do wrong acts (harm-based 
retribution); the second, which is subjective, is that the perpetrators know 
that the acts they do are wrong, and yet choose to act upon their antisocial 
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impulses (culpability-based retribution).290  Central to any retributive 
punishment is the premise of moral blameworthiness, which 
presupposes moral rationality.291  Thus, the perpetrators ultimately deserve 
punishment precisely because they are rational individuals who consciously 
choose to act immorally and do harm. 
The understanding of moral rationality that underlies and justifies 
retributive punishment is grounded in the same cognition-based 
psychological assumptions about the mental ingredients of moral rationality 
as those that ground culpability.292  Only an individual with a solid 
intellectual capacity is assumed to be able to make a conscious decision to 
engage in conduct that rejects his or her community’s moral norms and, 
consequently, to appreciate the retributive force of the punishment for his or 
her misconduct. 293  On the contrary, it makes no sense to punish someone 
who is not able to comprehend the retributive path of punishment.  From 
this perspective, retribution is the logical conclusion of a normative 
syllogism, the premise of which is precisely a cognition-based view of 
moral rationality and hence of culpability.  If culpability presupposes 
intellect-based moral rationality, and retribution presupposes culpability, 
then punishment is justified as long as it is directed to individuals who are 
provided with the intellectual faculties that make them morally rational. 
If the premises of this syllogism are changed, the conclusions 
inevitably also change.  In fact, if the substance of the capacity for moral 
rationality, and hence of culpability, is enriched with certain emotional 
faculties, it follows that punishment is justified only when these conditions 
are also met.  Differently said, if being an individual capable of moral 
rationality, and consequently of moral blameworthiness, also requires 
possessing specific emotional capacities, then retributive punishment is 
justified as long as it is addressed to people who do possess these 
capacities.  Because mentally diseased or disordered individuals cannot 
justifiably be punished for their acts on the grounds that they do not possess 
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the relevant capacities for moral rationality—including the emotional 
capacities—then a legal insanity defense has to be sufficiently broad to 
encompass people whose mental illnesses rendered them unable to be 
morally rational at the time of the crime. 
In addition to these theoretical considerations, an expanded notion of 
legal insanity would also solve one of the main practical paradoxes of the 
criminal justice system, namely punishing mentally ill individuals with 
(often severe) socio-emotional impairments on the sole grounds that they do 
retain a cognitive capacity to know, or to understand, what they did at the 
time of the crime and that what they did was wrong.  The practical and 
paradoxical result is that these people get sentenced to a given penalty (let 
us assume medium- to long-term imprisonment) without actually being 
able, due to their mental illness, to perceive, appreciate, or follow the “re-
educative” path that retributive punishment is intended to incite. In 
addition, conventional punishment significantly undermines their successful 
reentry into the community and social reintegration subsequent to serving a 
(prison) sentence.294 
C. REHABILITATION 
The model of insanity proposed here would also better suit the 
purposes of rehabilitation.  Rehabilitation presupposes that punishment is 
justified as long as it can provide individuals with the means to be socially 
functional and, thus, to return to society as law-abiding citizens.295  To 
accomplish the goals of rehabilitation, adjudication and sentencing must be 
as careful and individualized as possible; that is, they must be tailored to the 
actual needs of individual perpetrators.296  The inclusion of emotional 
capacities in the legal notion of insanity would definitely allow for a more 
accurate evaluation of an individual’s personality in relation to the crime 
committed.  It may also offer a defendant who suffers from a severe mental 
illness (aside from cognitive diseases)297 that appears to have affected his or 
 
 294 See Arthur J. Lurigio et al., The Effects of Serious Mental Illness on Offender 
Reentry, 68 FED. PROB. 45 (2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files 
/68_2_9_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/XUU2-BY6Q]. 
 295 See Rehabilitation, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 1 
(Andreas von Hirsch et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009). 
 296 Id. 
 297 The adoption of a tripartite insanity test implies a broadening of the category of 
individuals that can potentially fall within the spectrum of this defense. The updated legal 
notion of mental illness would also include mental diseases or disorders characterized by a 
pathological lack of emotions and moral feelings towards other subjects, as well as those 
characterized by severe impairments in behavioral control—as long as it is convincingly 
proved that these conditions significantly compromised the person’s ability to refrain from 
66 COPPOLA [Vol. 109 
her capacity for prosocial behavior to attain access to rehabilitation 
programs that ordinary incarceration does not provide. 
As previously noted, even in those cases in which a defendant’s 
psychiatric diagnosis is one of a mental disease or disorder that 
compromises his or her socio-affective faculties, this condition may 
nonetheless prove insufficient to meet the legal criteria of insanity, and the 
defendant would therefore still be considered entirely punishable.  From a 
rehabilitative standpoint, as an abundance of literature shows, the result of 
punishing these people is the worsening of their socially vulnerable 
personalities.298 
At this point, critics could raise two main objections. Foremost, if 
current approaches to indefinite commitment of people found “not guilty by 
reason of insanity” (NGRI) are continued, prisoners who once would have 
been eligible for release after a determinate period of time could now be 
held for the rest of their lives—not necessarily something they would 
consider a positive development.  The second objection is that people with 
specific socio-affective disorders, especially psychopathy, are generally 
resistant to clinical treatment and have a proclivity to engage in stable 
criminal behavior, that is, they are socially dangerous.299  Admittedly, there 
is still little evidence regarding how this class of individuals can be 
successfully and appropriately treated.300 
However reasonable in a first gloss, these practical objections are not 
insurmountable.  Civil libertarian concerns about the risks of rerouting 
perpetrators with severely pathological socio-affective problems from the 
prison system to the civil commitment system fail to consider the point 
made above; that is, conventional incarceration has detrimental effects 
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especially on this class of individuals.301  Although prison sentences last for 
determinate periods of time, when these individuals are confined to a prison 
for their sentence, they are released with the same (or even worsened) 
mental conditions as they had when they began their sentence.302  In 
contrast, if these individuals were rerouted to (an ideally reformed) 303 civil 
commitment system, there would be the possibility of dealing with them 
more effectively than with conventional incarceration.  Ideally, as soon as 
they are assessed to no longer pose a threat to themselves and to others, 
they would be released with less propensity to engage in socially 
dysfunctional behavior as when they began their rehabilitation program.  
One option may be the construction or the staffing of specialized 
rehabilitation centers—using James Gilligan’s definition, “residential 
communities” or “centers for human development”304—as well as a greater 
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implementation of outpatient rehabilitation programs when conditions 
allow. 
Regarding the second objection, the lack of unanimous consensus 
about effective clinical treatments for offenders with certain types of mental 
disorders—like psychopathy—does not mean that the conventional prison 
system is the only or the right response to this particularly thorny class of 
individuals, nor that research should lose sight of identifying alternative 
ways to deal with them.  For instance, the British neuroscientist Daniel 
Reisel hypothesizes that empathy training programs in secure, socially-
stimulating environments other than prison facilities could be an asset to 
treat offenders with socio-affective deficits, such as psychopaths have.305  
He posits that relationally-based situations could prove the most suitable 
way to create new opportunities for neural growth in the emotional circuits 
of the brain, increasing the likelihood of fostering empathy and sociable 
tendencies and enabling these offenders’ positive emotional transformations 
towards pro-social attitudes.306  These insights could lead to an increased 
adoption of individualized, inclusionary socio-rehabilitative measures, 
which act as positive incentives for high-risk offenders’ emotional healing 
and social functioning, thereby reducing risks of recidivism.  Admittedly, 
very little is known about this avenue of treatment.  Ensuring that research 
on these alternative treatment options remains a central tenet of future 
initiatives is thus crucial. 307 
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CONCLUSION 
This article offers a potential approach to how neuroscientific findings 
may be used to reshape the doctrine of legal insanity.  Its ultimate goal is 
not to provide definitive answers to the issues surrounding the insanity 
defense, but simply to lay some grounds on which to initiate further debates 
in criminal law.  Further research is needed to explore the practical 
corollaries of this new model of legal insanity.  For instance, it would be 
necessary to investigate how the newly introduced emotional prong of 
insanity standards would be assessed through reliable judgments (both 
empirical and normative).  Notably, it would be necessary to set parameters 
to determine when socio-affective deficits or abnormalities (assessed with 
behavioral and, perhaps, neuroscientific measures) could actually support a 
judgment of a defendant’s lack of, or severe impairment of, his or her 
emotional capacity in relation to the crime committed.  Another line of 
research could investigate in more detail the dividing line between total and 
partial insanity, as well as the sentencing regime following a hypothetical 
generic partial insanity verdict.  Last, but not least, future research could 
enquire after the possible implications of this model of insanity (both total 
and partial) for contentious classes of offenders.  The most notable example 
would be offenders with severe psychopathy.  These tasks are by no means 
easy and require careful and detailed elaboration at an interdisciplinary 
level.  Yet practical difficulties should not be used as a reason to not 
imagine circumstances in a different light. 
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